(1) A person is guilty of cruelty to animals in the second degree when except as authorized by law he intentionally or wantonly:
(a) Subjects any animal to or causes cruel or injurious mistreatment through abandonment, participates other than as provided in KRS § 525.125 in causing it to fight for pleasure or profit (including, but not limited to being a spectator or vendor at an event where a four (4) legged animal is caused to fight for pleasure or profit), mutilation, beating, torturing any animal other than a dog or cat, tormenting, failing to provide adequate food, drink, space, or health care, or by any other means;

Attorney's Note

Under the Kentucky Statutes, punishments for crimes depend on the classification. In the case of this section:
ClassPrisonFine
Class A misdemeanorup to 12 months up to $500
For details, see § 532.090

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Terms Used In Kentucky Statutes 525.130

  • Action: includes all proceedings in any court of this state. See Kentucky Statutes 446.010
  • Animal: includes every warm-blooded living creature except a human being. See Kentucky Statutes 446.010
  • Attorney: means attorney-at-law. See Kentucky Statutes 446.010
  • Conviction: A judgement of guilt against a criminal defendant.
  • Domestic: when applied to a corporation, partnership, business trust, or limited liability company, means all those incorporated or formed by authority of this state. See Kentucky Statutes 446.010
  • Domestic animal: means any animal converted to domestic habitat. See Kentucky Statutes 446.010
  • Federal: refers to the United States. See Kentucky Statutes 446.010
  • Restitution: The court-ordered payment of money by the defendant to the victim for damages caused by the criminal action.
  • Treatment: when used in a criminal justice context, means targeted interventions
    that focus on criminal risk factors in order to reduce the likelihood of criminal behavior. See Kentucky Statutes 446.010
  • Veto: The procedure established under the Constitution by which the President/Governor refuses to approve a bill or joint resolution and thus prevents its enactment into law. A regular veto occurs when the President/Governor returns the legislation to the house in which it originated. The President/Governor usually returns a vetoed bill with a message indicating his reasons for rejecting the measure. In Congress, the veto can be overridden only by a two-thirds vote in both the Senate and the House.

(b) Subjects any animal in his custody to cruel neglect; or
(c) Kills any animal other than a domestic animal killed by poisoning. This paragraph shall not apply to intentional poisoning of a dog or cat. Intentional poisoning of a dog or cat shall constitute a violation of this section.
(2) Nothing in this section shall apply to the killing of animals: (a) Pursuant to a license to hunt, fish, or trap;
(b) Incident to the processing as food or for other commercial purposes; (c) For humane purposes;
(d) For veterinary, agricultural, spaying or neutering, or cosmetic purposes;
(e) For purposes relating to sporting activities, including but not limited to horse racing at organized races and training for organized races, organized horse shows, or other animal shows;
(f) For bona fide animal research activities of institutions of higher education; or a business entity registered with the United States Department of Agriculture under the Animal Welfare Act or subject to other federal laws governing animal research;
(g) In defense of self or another person against an aggressive or diseased animal;
(h) In defense of a domestic animal against an aggressive or diseased animal;
(i) For animal or pest control; or
(j) For any other purpose authorized by law.
(3) Activities of animals engaged in hunting, field trials, dog training other than training a dog to fight for pleasure or profit, and other activities authorized either by a hunting license or by the Department of Fish and Wildlife shall not constitute a violation of this section.
(4) Cruelty to animals in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor.
(5) If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense under subsection (1) of this section arising from the person’s treatment of an equine, the court may impose one (1) or both of the following penalties against the person, in addition to fines and imprisonment:
(a) An order that the person pay restitution for damage to the property of
others and for costs incurred by others, including reasonable costs, as determined by agreement or by the court after a hearing, incurred in feeding, sheltering, veterinary treatment, and incidental care of any equine that was the subject of the offense resulting in conviction; or
(b) An order terminating or imposing conditions on the person’s right to possession, title, custody, or care of any equine that was the subject of the offense resulting in conviction.
If a person’s ownership interest in an equine is terminated by a judicial order under paragraph (b) of this subsection, the court may order the sale, conveyance, or other disposition of the equine that was the subject of the offense resulting in conviction.
Effective:June 29, 2017
History: Amended 2017 Ky. Acts ch. 145, sec. 1, effective June 29, 2017. — Amended 2003 Ky. Acts ch. 181, sec. 2, effective June 24, 2003. — Amended
1992 Ky. Acts ch. 463, sec. 66, effective July 14, 1992. — Amended 1984 Ky. Acts ch. 67, sec. 1, effective July 13, 1984. — Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 223, effective January 1, 1975.
Legislative Research Commission Note (3/30/90) The definition of “animal” contained in KRS § 446.010(2) does not reflect the amendatory language contained in Senate Bill 263 of the 1980 Regular Session of the Kentucky General Assembly because the 1980 Senate Journal indicates that Senate Bill
263 was vetoed by Governor John Y. Brown, Jr., on April 9, 1980, and recommitted by action of the Senate to its Committee on Appropriations and Revenue on April 14, 1980. Senate Bill 263 proposed to change KRS
446.010(2) to read as follows: ” ‘Animal’ includes every warmblooded living creature except birds and human beings;”. By a letter dated March 16, 1990, the Attorney General has informally opined that Governor Brown’s veto of Senate Bill 263 was not timely; that letter has exhibits showing that the bill was received by the Governor on March 28, 1980, and that his veto was received by the Senate Clerk on April 10, 1980.