Evidence m
The modern trend is to define relevance as having two components: materiality and probative value.  If the offered evidence is probative of a material issue in the case, it is by definition relevant.{footnote}FRE 401. 
            Cal. Evid. Code § 210 (West 1995).{/footnote}  Once it has been authenticated by its proponent, all relevant evidence is admissible unless it falls within a specific exclusion.{footnote} [3486]  FRE 402.{/footnote} 
Materiality

A material proposition is one that is properly at issue in the case.  Except for evidence as to the credibility of a witness, which is always material,{footnote}See Berry v. Deloney, 28 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 1994)(evidence is relevant if it makes the testimony of a witness more or less credible).
Mont. R. Evid. 401 ("relevant evidence may include evidence bearing upon the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant").{/footnote} whether evidence is material depends on the substantive law of the case and the state of the pleadings.

Probative Value

To be probative, evidence need only make it more or less likely that a material proposition is true{footnote} [3488] Conway v. Icahn & Co., Inc., 16 F.3d 504 (2d Cir. 1994).
State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386, 394 (Conn. 1993); State v. Payne, 402 S.E.2d 582, 595 (N.C. 1991) (expert in forensic fiber examination could properly testify that fiber from defendant’s shirt was microscopically consistent with fiber from a rug in the victim’s home and microscopically inconsistent with fiber taken forty-nine days after the crime from carpet in defendant’s residence, even though prosecution did not establish the carpet was in defendant’s residence at the time of the crime; applying N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 401).

[3488] Jennifer L. Pariser, Note: In Vino Veritas: The Truth About Blood Alcohol Presumptions In State Drunk Driving Law, 64 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 141, 160 n. 126 (1989), citing Carper & McCamey, Gaze Nystagmus: Scientific Proof of DUI?, Ill. B.J. 146, 146 (Nov. 1988).
[3488] People v. Dakuras, 527 N.E.2d 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
[3488] Hawkins v. State, 476 S.E.2d 803, 807 (Ga. 1996).
[3488] Hawkins v. State, 476 S.E.2d 803, 807 (Ga. 1996).
[3488] State v. Boyd, 479 N.E.2d 850, 851 (Ohio 1985).
[3488] See SELF-INCRIMINATION.
[3488] 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
[3488] ___U.S.____, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983).
[3488] State v. Theriault, 696 P.2d 718, 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Weatherford v. State, 692 S.W.2d 605 (Ark. 1985); People v. Boudreau, 115 A.D.2d 652, 496 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1985); Commonwealth v. Brennan, 438 N.E.2d 60 (Mass. 1982); State v. Badon, 401 So. 2d 1178 (La. 1981); State v. Arsenault, 336 A.2d 244 (N.H. 1975); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 547 A.2d 419, 422 (Pa. Super.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 496 U.S. 582 (1990)
See also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (not deciding issue).
[3488] ____161 Cal. App. 3d 717, 720, 207 Cal. Rptr. 793; People v. Miller, 447 N.E.2d 1060, 1061 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); Branch v. State, 932 S.W.2d 577, 583 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)
[3488] State v. Lee, 908 P.2d 44 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
[3488] Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 603-04 (1990).
[3488] See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 604 n. 17 (1990) (in dicta, stating that suspect’s responses to a question requiring him to calculate the date of his sixth birthday should have been suppressed because testimonial in nature and no Miranda warnings given beforehand).
Vickers v. State, 878 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (where police required suspect to recite alphabet from "f" to "w" and to count backwards from 90 to 75, response was testimonial and therefore inadmissible where Miranda warnings had not been given beforehand).
But see Branch v. State, 932 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (requesting the recitation of the alphabet does not constitute interrogation because question not designed to lead to confusion).
[3488] See 9 ALR2d 205 (financial condition of debtor); 14 ALR2d 485 (financial condition of wrongful death beneficiaries).
[3488] United States v. Delvecchio, 816 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1987) (evidence of lavish dinners hosted by defendant irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial); Arleth v. Freeport-McMoran Oil & Gas Co., 2 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 1993) (financial condition of one plaintiff in shareholder class action); Pagel v. Yates, 471 N.E.2d 946 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Annotation, 59 A.L.R.2d 371 (plaintiff’s financial condition in personal injury case).

[3488] Whitely v. OKC Corp., 719 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1983).
[3488] E.g., United States v. Contenti, 735 F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1984) (evidence of indebtedness properly used to show motive in arson prosecution).
Shatz v. American Surety Co. of America, 295 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Ky. 1955) (defendant’s string of gambling losses admissible to show motive for alleged embezzlement).
[3488] United States v.Zipkin, 729 F.2d 384 (6th Cir. 1984) [S&R]
[3488] Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1991) (age discrimination).
[3488] United States v. Traumunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1105 (2d Cir. 1975).

Check 91 ALR2d 1046.
[3488] United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 39 (2d Cir. 1973).
[3488] Wolf v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 555 F.Supp. 613 (D.N.J. 1982).[S&R]
[3488] Warren v. LeMay, 491 N.E.2d 464, 484.
[3488] Colmar v. Greater Niles Township Publishing Corp., 141 N.E.2d 652, 656 (Ill. App. Ct. 1957); Spelina v. Sporry, 279 Ill. App. 376 (1935); Annotation, 9 A.L.R.3d 692.
[3488] Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Rotches Pork Packers, Inc., 969 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1992), on remand, 1993 WL 118520 (factual findings of bankruptcy court); In re Delta Resources, Inc., 54 F.3d 722 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied Orix Credit Alliance v. Delta Resources, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 488, 133 L.Ed.2d 415 (factual findings of bankruptcy court).
[3488]Nipper v. Snipes, 7 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549 (11th Cir. 1994).
[3488]Nipper v. Snipes, 7 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 1993)
[3488] 40 ALR4th 575
[3488] United States v. Perillo, 164 F.2d 645 (2d Cir. 1947); United States v. Chiarelli, 192 F.2d 528  (7^th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913, reh’g denied, 342 U.S. 950 (1951).
Sims v. State, 46 So.2d 564 (Ala. 1950); Garcia v. State, 229 P. 103 (Ariz. 1924); People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 165 P.2d 3, aff’d, 332 U.S. 46, reh’g denied, 332 U.S. 784 (1946); Martin v. State, 129 So. 112 (Fla. 1930); People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911); Commonwealth v. Morris, 662 N.E.2d 683, 685 (Mass. 1996); State v. Cooper, 67 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1949); People v. Doty, 269 App. Div. 752, 54 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1945); Bingle v. State, 161 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Crim. 1942).
See also People v. Eyler, 549 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 1989) (Superglue may be used to enhance a fingerprint, and the results have been held admissible).
[3488] Piquett v. United States, 81 F2d 75 (7^th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 664 (1936).
 People v. Jennings, 96 N.E. 1077 (Ill. 1911); Murphy v. State, 40 A.2d 239 (Md. 1944); Lamble v. State, 114 A. 346 (N.J. 1921); State v. Rogers, 64 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1951); Stacy v. State, 292 P. 885 (Okla. Crim. 1930); Grice v. State, 151 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. 1941); State v. Lapan, 141 A. 686 (Vt. 1928); Bridges v. State, 19 N.W.2d 529 (Wis. 1945).
[3488] State v. Hall, 262 So. 2d 498, 499 (La. 1972); State v. Wimberly, 787 P.2d 729, 735 (Kan. 1990).
[3488] FRE 901(a), (b)(3).

Check 40 ALR4th 575.
[3488] See United States v. Mangan, 575 F.2d 32, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing FRE 705).
[3488] State v. Willette, 455 S.E.2d 621 (N.C. 1995).
[3488] People v. Crosslin, 251 Cal. App.2d 968, 975-77, 60 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1967).
[3488] Straub v. State, 567 N.E.2d 87, 93-94 (Ind. 1991) (also holding that copies of cards need not be certified).
[3488] Commonwealth v. Ghee, 607 N.E.2d 1005 (Mass. 1993).
[3488] Dillon v. State, 877 S.W.2d 915 (Ark. 1994).
[3488] Commonwealth v. Morris, 662 N.E.2d 683 (Mass. 1996).
[3488] Borum v. United States, 127 App. D.C. 48, 380 F.2d 595 (1967); United States v. Cary, 152 App. D.C. 321, 470 F.2d 269 (1972).
Lee v. State, 931 S.W.2d 433 (Ark. 1996).
[3488] United States v. Harris, 530 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1976).
[3488] Borum v. United States, 380 F.2d 595 (D.C. Cir. 1967); United States v. Nazarok, 330 F. Supp. 1054 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
State v. Wimberly, 787 P.2d 729, 734 (Kan. 1990); State v. Bass, 303 N.C. 267, 278 S.E.2d 209 (1981); State v. Scott, 296 N.C. 519, 251 S.E.2d 414 (1979); Crouch v. State, 498 S.W.2d 97 (Tenn. 1973).
See also Commonwealth v. Morris, 662 N.E.2d 683, 685 (Mass. 1996) (If the only identification evidence is the defendant’s fingerprint at the crime scene, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fingerprint was placed there during the crime.)
[3488] State v. Montgomery, 461 S.E.2d 732 (N.C. 1995) (substantial evidence required).
[3488] Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
[3488] Cummings v. State, 172 S.E.2d 395 (Ga. 1970).
[3488] Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 499, 510-511 (1896); United States v. Zabic, 745 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Schepp, 746 F.2d 406 (8th Cir. 1984) (flight after learning of FBI inquiries); United States v. Tille, 729 F.2d 615 (9th Cir. 1984) (RICO).
Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985) (evidence of flight was properly introduced where the flight occurred several days after the victim disappeared); also Straight v. State, 397 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1981)(flight and use of deadly force against officer one day after murder and other crimes properly admitted as relevant to consciousness of guilt); State v. Edison, 569 A.2d 657, 660 (Md. 1990) (escape from confinement); Hunt v. State, 540 A.2d 1125, 1132 (Md. 1988)(flight from crime scene); Williams v. State, 667 So. 2d 15, 23 (Miss. 1996); State v. Price, 562 N.W.2d 340, 345 (Neb. 1997); State v. King, 468 S.E.2d 232, 238 (N.C. 1996); Commonwealth v. Gorby, 588 A.2d 902, 909 (Pa. 1991); In re Caldarone, 345 A.2d 871, 876 (R.I. 1975); Prindle v. State, 945 P.2d 1180, 1183 (Wyo. 1997) (videotape of flight from scene of car crash more probative than prejudicial).
2 Wigmore, Evidence § 276 at 128 (1979 & Supp. 1997) (the principle that flight evidence is admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt "has been sanctioned so many times that its frequent modem repetition has become redundant").
But see Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896) (an accused’s mere flight from the crime scene, while relevant to the question of guilt, is insufficient to raise a presumption thereof).
[3488] United States v. Malizia, 503 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1974).
[3488] United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1987); United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversing conviction); United States v. Howze, 668 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1982).
Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1997) evidence of flight was inadmissible because it occurred in another state twenty-seven days after the murder at issue and the defendant had no reason to believe he was a suspect in the murder at the time of the flight); Williams v. State, 667 So. 2d 15, 23 (Miss. 1996) (evidence of flight inadmissible where there is an independent reason for flight known by the court which cannot be explained to the jury because of its prejudicial effect upon the defendant).
[3488] United States v. Harris, 792 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1986) (such proof only required where defendant’s flight is only evidence of perpetrator’s identity).

But check United States v. Porter, 821 F.2d 968 (4th Cir. 1987).
[3488] United States v. Scott, 446 F.2d 509 (1971) (no jury instruction proper).
[3488] 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977).
[3488] Myers, 550 F.2d at 1049.
Accord State v. Cooke, 479 A.2d 727, 732-33 (R.I. 1984).
See also 2 Weinstein’s Federal Evidence § 401.08[4], n.21 (1997).
[3488] United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1977) (reversing conviction)
Escobar v. State, 699 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1997) evidence of flight was inadmissible because it occurred in another state twenty-seven days after the murder at issue and the defendant had no reason to believe he was a suspect in the murder at the time of the flight); Merritt v. State, 523 So. 2d 573 (Fla. 1988)( evidence of flight was erroneously introduced because the flight occurred three years after the crime).
But see United States v. Touchstone, 726 F.2d 1116 (6th Cir. 1984) (evidence of flight three years after drug offenses charged held admissible; timing goes to weight, not admissibility).

Check United States v. Feldman, 788 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1986).
[3488] Engebretsen v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d 721 (6th Cir. 1994) (alleged failure of stall avoidance system).
[3488] Hale v. State, 101 So. 774 (Ala. App. Ct. 1924), cert denied, 101 So. 775 (1924); Mann v. State, 22 Fla. 600 (1886); Paschal v. State, 229 S.E.2d 795 (Ga. App. Ct. 1976); Commonwealth v. Bartolini, 13 N.E.2d 382 (Mass.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 565 (1938); People v. Sunset Bay, 67 N.Y.2d 787, 501 N.Y.S.2d 19, 492 N.E.2d 127 (1986) (photometric analysis); State v. Bullard, 322 S.E.2d 370 (N.C. 1984); Moore v. State, 226 S.W. 415 (Tex. Crim. 1920); State v. Lapan, 141 A. 686 (Vt. 1928).
Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Admissibility Of Bare Footprint Evidence, 45 A.L.R.4th 1178.
[3488] State v. Abbott, 654 S.W.2d 260 (Mo. App. Ct. 1983) (evidence technician properly allowed to testify as to the position a person would have to be in to make a footprint found on the outside wall of a bathtub in the victim’s home).
[3488] United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370, 1376-77 (9^th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1103 (1977) (Swiss bank records).
[3488] United States v. Serrate, 534 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1976) (ID card, birth certificate, military records, death certificate, passport records and demographic registry); United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976) (police records); United States v. Pacheco-Lovio, 463 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1972) (Mexican birth certificate); United States v. Wing, 450 F.2d 806, 810-12 (9th Cir. 1972).
[3488] Aaron v. State, 139 So. 2d 309 (Ala. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 846 (1962); Greenway v. State, 626 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1980); State v. Navarro, 367 P.2d 227 (Ariz. 1961); Gabbard v. State, 285 S.W.2d 515 (Ark. 1956); People v. Montague, 508 P.2d 388 (Colo. 1973); State v. Beliveau, 678 A.2d 924 (Conn. 1996) (referring to docrine as “the constancy of accusation doctrine”); State v. Brewer, 114 A. 604 (Del. 1921); Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211 (D.C. App. 1993); Lyles v. State, 412 So. 2d 458 (Fla. App. Ct. 1982); Epps v. State, 118 S.E.2d 574 (Ga.), cert. denied sub nom. Alford v. Georgia, 368 U.S. 849 (1961); State v. Hall, 397 P.2d 261 (Idaho 1964); People v. Lawler, 568 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 1991); Woods v. State, 119 N.E.2d 558 (Ind. 1954); State v. Ladehoff, 122 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 1963); State v. Hoskinson, 96 P. 138 (Kan. 1908); Cook v. Commonwealth, 351 S.W.2d 187 (Ky. 1961); State v. Robertson, 89 La. Ann. 618 (1886); State v. Calor, 585 A.2d 1385 (Me. 1991); State v. Werner, 489 A.2d 1119 (Md. 1985); People v. Taylor, 239 N.W.2d 627 (Mich. App. Ct. 1976); Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886 (Miss. 1968); State v. Van Doren, 657 S.W.2d 708 (Mo. App. 1983); State v. Peres, 71 P. 162 (Mont. 1903); State v. Daniels, 388 N.W.2d 446 (Neb. 1986); State v. Campbell, 17 P. 620 (Nev. 1888); State v. Lynch, 45 A.2d 885 (N.H. 1946); State v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1990); State v. Baca, 242 P.2d 1002 (N.M. 1952); People v. McDaniel, 81 N.Y.2d 10, 611 N.E.2d 265, 595 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1993); State v. Freeman, 100 N.C. 429, 5 S.E. 921 (N.C. 1888); State v. Gebhard, 13 N.W.2d 290 (N.D. 1944); Roberts v. State, 194 P.2d 219 (Okla. Crim. 1948); State v. Campbell, 705 P.2d 694 (Ore. 1985); Commonwealth v. Green, 409 A.2d 371 (Pa. 1979); State v. Russo, 142 A. 543 (R.I. 1928); Simpkins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 142 (S.C. 1991); State v. Twyford, 186 N.W.2d 545 (S.D. 1971); State v. Kendricks, 891 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tenn. 1994); Vera v. State, 709 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); State v. Martinez, 326 P.2d 102 (Utah 1958); State v. Willett, 62 A. 48 (Vt. 1905); Pepoon v. Commonwealth, 66 S.E.2d 854 (Va. 1951); State v. Ferguson, 667 P.2d 68 (Wash. 1983); State v. Golden, 336 S.E.2d 198 (W. Va. 1985); Hannon v. State, 36 N.W. 1 (Wis. 1888); Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044 (Wyo. 1979).
See generally Graham, The Cry of Rape: The Prompt Complaint Doctrine and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 19 Willamette L. Rev. 489 (1983).
But see State v. Brigandi, 442 A.2d 927 (Conn. 1982) (untimely nature of complaints affects weight, not admissibility).
Contra People v. Brown, 8 Cal. 4th 746, 760, 883 P.2d 949, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 407 (1994) (abolishing rule, but holding that such evidence is admissible if it will "assist the jury in arriving at a more reliable determination as to whether the offense occurred.")
CHECK Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, & 115-12.
[3488] State v. Troupe, 677 A.2d 917, 926 (Conn. 1996); Territory v. Schilling, 17 Haw. 249 (1906), overruled in part on other grounds, Territory v. Nishi, 24 Haw. 677 (1919), and Territory v. Silva, 27 Haw. 270 (1923); Commonwealth v. Licata, 591 N.E.2d 672 (Mass. 1992); State v. Blohm, 281 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1979); Johnson v. State, 17 Ohio 593 (1848).
[3488] State v. Troupe, 677 A.2d 917, 924 (Conn. 1996);
4 J. Wigmore, Evidence (4th Ed. 1972) § 1135, p. 298.
6 Wigmore, § 1760, at 240
[3488] State v. Troupe, 677 A.2d 917, 923 (Conn. 1996).
[3488] State v. Troupe, 677 A.2d 917, 923 (Conn. 1996).
{/footnote}–it need not be convincing,{footnote}See, e.g., Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1977) (speculative evidence of lost profits admissible).  See also United States v. Madera, 574 F2d 1320 (5th Cir. 1978); Douglass v. Eaton Corp., 956 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1992)(weight or sufficiency of evidence not to be considered).{/footnote} let alone constitute proof.{footnote} [3490] Bhaya v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 922 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1990), rehearing denied, cert. denied 501 U.S. 1217, 111 S.Ct. 2827, 115 L.Ed.2d 997; Douglass v. Eaton Corp., 956 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1992); Smith v. Georgia, 684 F.2d 729 (11th Cir. 1982)(evidence of employer retaliation against other employees offered in discrimination case).
Insurance Co. of North America v. Cooke, 624 So. 2d 252, 256 (Fla. 1993).{/footnote}  The key inquiry under the federal rules is whether the evidence with aid the trier of fact.   The standard is a liberal one.{footnote}Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, on remand 43 F.3d 1311, rehearing en banc denied, cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 189, 133 L.Ed.2d 126 (1993); Blancha v. Raymark Industries, 972 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1992)(federal rules diminished trial judge’s discretion to exclude evidence as irrelevant).{/footnote}

Appeal

Whether evidence is relevant is matter for the exercise of the trial court’s discretion.{footnote}In re Air Disaster at Lockerbie Scotland on Dec. 21, 1988, 37 F.3d 804  (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Pagnucco, 115 S.Ct. 934, 130 L.Ed.2d 880; United States v. Miranda-Uriarte, 649 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981).{/footnote}  Trial courts are permitted broad discretion when making relevance determinations.{footnote} [3493] Veranda Beach Club Ltd. Partnership v. Western Sur. Co., 936 F.2d 1364 (1st Cir. 1991); Gentile v. County of Suffolk, 926 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991); Douglass v. Eaton Corp., 956 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ahangaran, 998 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1993).
Webb v. State, 938 S.W.2d 806 (Ark. 1997); _______, 788 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Ida. 1989).
But see Blancha v. Raymark Industries, 972 F.2d 507 (3d Cir. 1992)(federal rules diminished trial judge’s discretion to exclude evidence as irrelevant).
{/footnote}  The trial court’s decision to exclude evidence as irrelevant will not be reversed unless substantial rights are affected.{footnote}Moran v. H.W.S. Lumber Co., 538 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1976).{/footnote}

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