Remedial measures as to what is alleged to be a negligent condition causing injury to the plaintiff are not admissible to show negligence or culpable conduct.{footnote} [3497]  FRE 407; CAL. § 1151; Polythane Systems, Inc. v. Marina Ventures Intern., Ltd., 993 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1064, 127 L.Ed.2d 383;  Bailey v. Kawasaki-Kisen, K.K., 455 F.2d 392 (5th Cir. 1972); Ford v. Schmidt, 577 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1978).  {/footnote}  Note that this rule does not exclude evidence of measures taken to remedy conditions (e.g., dents in a car) not alleged to be the cause of the injury, but rather constituting evidence of the injury.{footnote} [3498]  64 ALR 2d 1214.
{/footnote}  "Culpable conduct" has been held to include breach of warranty{footnote}Cameron v. Otto Bock Orthopedic Industry, Inc., 43 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1994)(applying Massachusetts law).{/footnote} and patent infringement.{footnote}Vardon Golf Co., Inc. v. BBMG Golf Ltd., 156 F.R.D. 641 (N.D. Ill. 1994).{/footnote}

Any use of evidence of subsequent remedial measures to show something relevant other than negligence or culpability is proper.  The evidence must be excluded, however, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of the jury drawing an improper inferrence{footnote}Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 981 F.2d 25 (1st Cir. 1992); Malone v. Microdyne Corp., 26 F.3d 471 (4th Cir. 1994)(company’s Form 10-K annual  report referring to matters excluded from earlier reports held properly excluded).

But see Eiland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 176 (5th Cir. 1995)(probative value as to causality not substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice).{/footnote} or becoming confused.{footnote}But see Herrington v. Hiller, 883 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1989)(hospital’s subsequent institution of 24-hour anesthesia services admissible despite objections of jury confusion).{/footnote}  The defendant may be allowed to introduce evidence that the "remedial" measure were taken for reasons having nothing to do with safety.{footnote}Smith v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 818, 393 N.E.2d 598 (1st Dist. 1979).{/footnote} 

The federal rules specifically state that evidence of remedial measures may be introdued to establish ownership, control, feasibility of precautionary measures, and as impeachment.{footnote}FRE 407.{/footnote}  These uses, discussed further infra, are only meant as illustrations, and not as an exhaustive list of the permissible uses of this evidence.{footnote}Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).{/footnote} 

To Show Ownership or Control

Evidence that a party undertook remedial measures may be introduced to show that the party owned or controlled the property or thing involved.{footnote}Clausen v. Sea-3, Inc., 21 F.3d 1181 (1st Cir. 1994)(admissible to show control of ramp at dock, where limiting instruction given); 170 ALR 43.{/footnote}  [Must it be controverted?]

To Show Feasibility if Controverted

Subsequent remedial measures are admissible to show the feasibility of such measures if the feasibility of such measures is contested.{footnote}Espeaignnette v. Gene Tierney Co., Inc., 43 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994)(trial court erroneously excluded evidence of guard welded to saw where feasibility was disputed; evidence not more prejudicial than probative); Polythane Systems, Inc. v. Marina Ventures Intern., Ltd., 993 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1993)(dictum), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1064, 127 L.Ed.2d 383; Reese v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 793 F.2d 1416, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1986)(operations manual admissible where manufacturer claimed only retailer could advise customer of location of boat engine kill switch); Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 583-84 (5th Cir. 1985)(evidence of tractor design alterations admissible where defendant claimed alterations would impair operator’s ability to see); Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 917, 113 S.Ct. 1274, 122 L.Ed.2d 669 (1992); Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 1989)(brochure admissible where manufacturer claimed it was not feasible to provide warnings); Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).

Smith v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 74 Ill. App. 3d 818, 393 N.E.2d 598 (1st Dist. 1979)(defendant allowed to show change in product design not for safety reasons).

But see Pestel v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 64 F.3d 382

Check Anderson v. Malloy, 700 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1983)
CHECK Grenada Steel Industry v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983){/footnote}  Where feasibility has not been contested, the evidence is excluded not only under FRE 407{footnote}Cameron v. Otto Bock Orthopedic Industry, Inc., 43 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1994); Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991)(feasibility stipulated); In re Joint Eastern Dist. and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 995 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1993)(reversible error to admit evidence of subsequent warnings on issue of feasibility if feasibility not controverted); Fish v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 779 F.2d 836, 840 (2d Cir. 1985); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 91 (3d Cir. 1979); Hardy v. Chemetron Corp., 870 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1989)(defendant conceded feasibility).{/footnote} but under FRE 403 as well due to the danger of unfair prejudice.{footnote}Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1979).{/footnote}

In one case where the plaintiff offered evidence of a saefty guard that allegedly could have prevented injury from a stump remover, the evidence was excluded since the design of the guard was not yet complete and it was not capable of being implemented in its present form.{footnote}Pestel v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 64 F.3d 382 (8th Cir. 1994).{/footnote}

When is feasibility deemed "controverted"?  The majority approach is to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures where the defendant has not explicity contested feasibility.{footnote}Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 855 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983); Bauman v. Volkwagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1980)(defendants merely disputed reasons for design change); Probus v. K-Mart, Inc., 794 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1986)(feasibility of alternative end cap for ladder).{/footnote}  For example, it has been held that feasibility has not truly been controverted where the defendant merely claims that the original product was safe{footnote}Grenada Steel Indus. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983); Bauman v. Volkwagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 233 (6th Cir. 1980)(defendants merely disputed reasons for design change).{/footnote} or that the information provided with the product was adequate.{footnote}See also McPadden v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 995 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1993)(feasibility of warning not controverted where defendant merely claimed that no warning was required); Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir. 1980)(feasibility of change in warning for prescription drug not controverted where defendant claimed merely that original warning adequate given what it knew at the time); Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 763-64 (5th Cir. 1989)(defendant merely claimed that original instruction manual was satisfactory).

{/footnote}  Likewise, it has been held that feasibility has not been controverted where the defendant merely asserts that the remedial measure at issue would itself create other hazards{footnote}Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir.1984)(feasibility not controverted where manufacturer merely claimed that remedial measures would make motorcycly safer for some users but more dangerous for others, including intended purchasers); Oberst v. International Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1980)(defendant argued that alternative design would be a problem in other types of accidents).{/footnote} or disadvantages{footnote}Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 638 (9th Cir.), amended 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986)(feasibility not controverted where manufacturer conceded safety device was feasible, but contented that device would make product too complicated for consumers).{/footnote} to the consumer.  Some courts, however, have held such evidence admissible unless the defendant explicity concedes the issue.{footnote}Ross v. Black & Decker, Inc., 977 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 917, 113 S.Ct. 1274, 122 L.Ed.2d 669 (where a defeendant has refused to enter into a pre-trial stipulation as to the feasibility of remedial measures, the issue has been held to be disputed, opening the door to evidence of such measures; manufacturor added blade guard to saw); Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297 (10th Cir. 1984).{/footnote}

It has been stated to be "questionable" whether a plaintiff should be permitted to ask a defendant to deny feasibility as a pretext for getting this evidence in.{footnote}Robbins v. Farmers Union Terminal Ass’n, 552 F.2d 788, 792 n. 8 (8th Cir. 1977).{/footnote}

Impeachment

Evidence of remedial measures may be introduced to impeach a defendant’s testimony suggesting that its original design was the best,{footnote}

See also Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1984)(defendant asserted that it would never have made the subject design change).{/footnote} or safest design.{footnote}Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc. II, 887 F.2d 34, 42 (3d Cir. 1989)(evidence of warning decal admissible where defendant’s expert asserted that product design eliminated any possibility of danger).

CHECK Polythane Systems, Inc. v. Marina Ventures Intern., Ltd., 993 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1064, 127 L.Ed.2d 383.

CHECK Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978).{/footnote} 

[Defense witnesses who claim that a condition was safe may be impeached with evidence that they themselves subsequently caused the condition to be remedied.{footnote}CHECK THESE CASES–  Pitasi v. Stratton Corp., 968 F.2d 1558 (2d Cir. 1992)(defendant’s testimony that ski slope side entrances were safe properly impeached with evidence that they were subsequently roped off); Eiland v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 58 F.3d 176 (5th Cir. 1995)(circuit breaker); Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977); Westbrooks v. Gordon B. Hall, Inc., 248 Cal. App. 2d 209 (1967).{/footnote}] 

A plaintiff cannot offer impeachment evidence of subsequent remedial measures where the defendant has merely attempted to show that the original design was appropriate,{footnote}Harrison v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 981 F.2d 25, 31 (1st Cir. 1992); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1278 (3d Cir. 1992); Public Serv. Co. v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 773 F.2d 783, 792 (7th Cir. 1985).{/footnote} that due care was exercised,{footnote}Hardy v. Chemetron Corp., 870 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1989); Probus v. K-Mart, Inc., 794 F.2d 1207, 1210 (7th Cir. 1986); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1984).{/footnote} or that the alleged defect was not the cause of the injury.{footnote}Hardy v. Chemetron Corp., 870 F.2d 1007, 1011 (5th Cir. 1989).{/footnote}

Remedial Measures Taken by Third Parties.
 
This exclusionary rule does not bar evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken by third parties.{footnote}Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1524 (1st Cir. 1991)(repairs made to sideloader by employer not excludable in suit against manufacturer); TLT-Babcock, Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 33 F.3d 397 (4th Cir. 1994); Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prods. & Mfg., 798 F.2d 700, 719-20 (5th Cir. 1986)(employer’s memo describing repairs improperly excluded in suit where employer not a party); Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 1985)(employer’s repairs not excludable in suit where employer not a party); Mehojah v. Drummond, 56 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 1995)(evidence admissible even if third party is potential defendant).

 CHECK Espeaignette v. Gene Tierney Co., Inc., 43 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1994). CHECK Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528 n. 20 (8th Cir. 1977){/footnote}

Repairs Required by Superior Authority

Repairs required by an authority superior to the defendant, such as a regulatory agency, are generally held not to be excludable under this rule.{footnote}Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir. 1978); O’Dell v. Hercules, Inc., 904 F.2d 1194, 1204 (8th Cir. 1990); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984).

But see  Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir. 1980)(excluding evidence of change in warning for prescription drug mandated by FDA).

See E. Lee Reichert, Note, The "Superior Authority Exception" to Federal Rule of Evidence 407: The "Remedial Measure" Required to Clarify a  Confused State of Evidence, 3 U. Ill. L. Rev. 843 (1991).{/footnote}

Strict Liability Cases

Because negligence or culpability is immaterial to a strict liability action, most state courts have held that the exclusionary rule relating to remedial measures does not apply.{footnote}Dura Corp. v. Harned, 703 P.2d 396, 411 (Alaska 1985); Ault v. International Harvester, 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974); Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 708 P.2d 297, 302 (1985); Frank v. Volkswagenwerk of Wolfsburg Germany, 432 N.Y.S.2d 787, 105 Misc.2d 760 (1980); Klug v. Keller Industries, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 847, 852 (S.D. 1982); D.L. by Friederichs v. Huebner, 110 Wis.2d 581, 329 N.W.2d 890, 903 (1983); Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis.2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977); Caldwell v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd.,648 P.2d 519 (Wyo. 1982).

Contra Krause v. American Aerolights, Inc., 762 P.2d 1011, 1016 (Or. 1988).{/footnote}  Most of the federal ciruit courts have held that the exclusionary rule does apply to strict liability cases.{footnote}Prentiss & Carlisle Co., Inc. v. Koehring-Waterous Div. of Timberjack, Inc., 972 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1992); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir. 1980); Muzyka v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 774 F.2d 1309, 1310 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1985); Hall v. American S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1067 (6th Cir. 1982); Oberst v. International Harvester Co., Inc., 640 F.2d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1980); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir.), amended 805 F.2d 337 (9th Cir. 1986); Wood v. Morbark Industries, Inc., 70 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 1995)(wood chipper); Wusinich v. Aeroquip Corp., 843 F.Supp. 959 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

Contra Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1063, 127 L.Ed.2d 383; Bizzle v. McKesson Corp., 961 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1992); Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Assoc., 552 F. 2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977);  Ault v. Int’l Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113 (1974) (G);  Farnar v. Paccar, Inc, 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977); Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470 (10th Cir. 1990); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 716 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984); Misener v. General Motors, 924 F. Supp. 130 (D. Utah 1996).

See generally Michele B.  Colodney, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 as Applied to Products Liability: A Rule in Need of Remedial Measures, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 283 (Nov. 1993); Matthew L. Kimball, Note, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Strict Liability Actions: Some Suggestions Regarding Federal Rule of Evidence 407, 39 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1415, 1429 (1982).{/footnote}  One federal court  which held the rule generally inapplicable to strict liability cases nonetheless held the rule applicable to a strict liability suit based on the manufacturer’s failure to warn.{footnote}DeLuryea v. Winhrop Laboratories, 697 F.2d 222, 228-29 (8th Cir. 1983).{/footnote}

Internal Reports

A defendant’s internal report analyzing a product or occurrence which is the subject of a suit, but which does not discuss remedial measures, will not be exlcuded under this rule,{footnote}Prentiss & Carlisle v. Koehring-Waterous, 972 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1992); Benitez-Allende v. Alcan Aluminio do Brasil, S.A., 857 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989); Allred v. Maersk Line, Ltd., 35 F.3d 139 (4th Cir. 1994)(captain’s redacted report on seaman’s accident admissible where no subsequent remedial measures discussed); Dow Chemical Corp. v. Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 481, 487 (10th Cir. 1990); Rocky Mountain Helicopters v. Bell Helicopters, 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986);  McFarlane v. Catepillar, Inc., 974 F.2d 176, 181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Misener v. General Motors, 924 F.Supp. 130 (D. Utah 1996).

Weinstein & 407[01] at 407-12 to 407-13.

CHECK Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir. 1978).
{/footnote} even if the analysis led to remedial measures.{footnote}Prentiss & Carlisle Co., Inc. v. Koehring-Waterous Div. of Timberjack, Inc., 972 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1992)(memorandum analyzing problem with cable on timber harvesting machine and lette to customers advising them to reroute cable held admissile).{/footnote}  The analysis might be excluded under this rule to the extent that it refers to preventative measures which should have been taken.  If such measures were taken subsequently, the report would arguably be evidence of the subsequent remedial measures and thus within this exclusionary rule. {CASES?}  In medical malpractice cases, such reports are sometimes barred under a separate rule.{footnote}See, e.g., Cal. § 1157.{/footnote}

Pre-Accident Remedial Measures

While there is general agreement that evidence of "subsequent" remedial measures must be excluded, courts have divided over the meaning of "subsequent."  Some courts have held that evidence of any measures taken subsequent to the manufacture  of a product is inadmissible.{footnote}See Fish v. Georgia-Pacific, 779 F.2d 836, 838-40 (2d Cir. 1985)(in dicta, court states that time period governed by exclusionary rule begins to run after manufacture of product).

Check Wusinich v. Aeroquip Corp., 843 F.Supp. 959 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
{/footnote}  Some courts have held that only evidence of measures taken subsequent to the sale of a product is inadmissible.{footnote}Kelly v. Crown Equipment Co., 970 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1992); Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc. I, 831 F.2d 1191, 1197 (3d Cir. 1987); Clarksville-Montgomery County School System v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 925 F.2d 993, 1001 n. 17 (6th Cir. 1991)(in dicta, stating that post-sale documents relating to problems with products property excluded).{/footnote} Still other courts have narrowed the scope of the exclsuionary rule further by holding that only evidence of measures taken subsequent to the accident at issue in the case is inadmissible.{footnote}Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1524 (1st Cir. 1991)(design changes made to sideloader); Cates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 928 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1991); Roberts v. Harnischfeger Corp., 901 F.2d 42, 44 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1989)(dicta); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1343 (5th Cir. 1978);Traylor v. Husqvarna Motor, 988 F.2d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 1993); Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1482 (10th Cir. 1990).

But see Wusinich v. Aeroquip Corp., 843 F. Supp. 959 (E.D. Pa. 1994)(preaccident measures excluded where offered to show causation and failure to provide postsale warnings to customers and failure to recall, where plaintiff had failed to allege in complaint claims of failure to warn and failure to recall).

Check Misener v. General Motors, 924 F. Supp. 130 (D. Utah 1996)(rule applies only to measures taken after date of accident).

CHECK Roth v. Black & Decker, U.S., Inc., 737 F.2d 779, 782 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1984)(design changes to electric saw).{/footnote}   The federal rules state:

When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.{footnote}FRE 407 (emphasis supplied).{/footnote}

This language suggests that the drafters of the federal rules intended  the last, narrowest interpretation.{footnote}Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1482 (10th Cir. 1990).  See Michele B.  Colodney, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 as Applied to Products Liability: A Rule in Need of Remedial Measures, 48 U. Miami L. Rev. 283, 304-08 (Nov. 1993).{/footnote}

Danger of Undue Prejudice

Even where evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible under the traditional exclsuionary rule, the evidence may be excluded on the grounds of undue prejudice.{footnote}Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 584 (5th Cir. 1985); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service, Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1328-29 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958 (1984);

But see Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978)(admission of warning bullletin as impeachment held not unduly prejudicial).{/footnote}  See also PREJUDICE.

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