See also CO-CONSPIRATOR STATEMENTS; CONFESSIONS

1.  Definition of "Accomplice"

For purposed of the rules of evidence, an "accomplice" is generally defined as a person who may be charged with the same crime for which the defendant is on trial.{footnote}Phelps v. United States, 252 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 19__); Stephenson v. United States, 211 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 19__).
Leonard v. State, 192 So. 2d 461, 469 (Ala. App. 1966); McClure v. State, 214 Ark. 159, 215 S.W.2d 524 (___); Turner v. State, 50 Del. 590, 137 A.2d 395; Bailey v. State, 76 Fla. 103, 79 So. 748; Kearce v. State, 178 Ga. 220, 172 S.E. 643; People v. Hrdlicka, 344 Ill. 211, 176 N.E. 308; State v. Wiese, 182 N.W.2d 918, 920 (Iowa 1971); Crouch v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 460, 257 S.W. 20; Trovato v. State, 36 Md. App. 183, 373 A.2d 78 (1977); State v. Jones, 347 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn. 1984); State v. Sweeney, 180 Minn. 450, 231 N.W. 225; State v. Richardson, 248 Mo. 563, 154 S.W. 735; State v. Douglas, 26 Nev. 196, 65 P. 802; People v. Small, 55 App. Div. 2d 994, 391 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1977); People v. Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371, 374-75, 298 N.E.2d 647, 649, 345 N.Y.S.2d 495, 498 (1973); State v. Bailey, 254 N.C. 380, 119 S.E.2d 165; Honeycutt v. State, 834 P.2d 993 (Okla. Crim. 1992); State v. Coffey, 157 Or. 457, 72 P.2d 35; Casone v. States, 193 Tenn. 303, 246 S.W.2d 22, cert. den. 343 U.S. 969, 72 S.Ct. 1066, 96 L.Ed. 1365; reh. den. 344 U.S. 849, 73 S.Ct. 49, 97 L.Ed. 660; Villarreal v. State, 708 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Crim. 1986);  State v. Davie, 121 Utah 184, 240 P.2d 263; Guthrie v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 461, 198 S.E. 481; Seattle v. Edwards, 50 Wash. 2d 735, 314 P.2d 436.
See also N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.22 (McKinney 1981) (defining “accomplice” to include one who “may reasonably be considered to have participated in:   (a) The offense charged; or (b) An offense based upon the same or some of the same facts or conduct which constitute the offense charged.
Check People v. Hoover, 12 Cal. 3d 875, 117 Cal. Rptr. 672, 528 P.2d 760 (19___) (only one chargeable as princial, not merely as accessory, is considered an "accomplice" within this rule).
Check Wilson v. State, 170 Neb. 494, 103 N.W.2d 258, cert. den. 364 U.S. 887 (____).{/footnote}  An informer or someone otherwise cooperating with law enforcement officers is not an "accomplice" for the purposes of these rules of evidence.{footnote}Brewer v. State, 551 S.W.2d 218 (Ark. 1977); People v. Buyle, 20 Cal. App. 2d 650, 68 P.2d 268; State v. McKean, 36 Iowa 343; State v. Gibbs, 109 Minn. 247, 123 N.W. 810; State v. Verganadis, 50 Nev. 1, 248 P. 900; State v. Currie, 13 N.D. 655, 102 N.W. 875; State v. Johnson, 112 Ohio App. 124, 16 Ohio ops.2d 51, 83 Ohio L. Abs. 437, 165 N.E.2d 814; Finley v. State, 84 Okla. Crim. 309, 181 P.2d 849; State v. Busick, 90 Or. 466, 177 P. 64 (___); Commonwealth v. Hollister, 157 Pa. 13, 27 A. 386; State v. Hoxsie, 22 A. 1059 (R.I. 19__); Sowells v. State, 99 Tex. Crim. 465, 270 S.W. 558; Guthrie v. Commonwealth, 171 Va. 461, 198 S.E. 481; Seattle v. Edwards, 50 Wash..2d 735, 314 P.2d 436; McAdams v. State, 23 Wyo 294, 149 P. 550.{/footnote}  Where the evidence on this point is disputed, it is for the jury to decide whether the witness is an accomplice,{footnote}Perry v. State, 340 So. 2d 895 (Ala. App. 1976); State v. Stufflebeam, 260 N.W.2d 409 (Iowa 1977); People v. Small, 55 App. Div. 2d 994, 391 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1977); State v. Thorson, 264 N.W.2d 441, 442 (N.D. 1978); Marlo v. State, 720 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. Crim. 1986).
Check Brewer v. State, 551 S.W.2d 218 (Ark. 1977); McIntosh v. State, 552 S.W.2d 649 (Ark. 1977).{/footnote} otherwise the trial judge may rule as a matter of law.{footnote}Leonard v. State, 192 So. 2d 461, 470-71 (Ala. App. 1966); Mobbs v. State, 307 Ark. 505, 821 S.W.2d 769 (1991) (victim of incest not an accomplice); People v. Daniels, 52 Cal. 3d 815, 277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906 (1991) (mere bystander not accomplice); People v. Beaudet, 32 N.Y.2d 371, 376, 298 N.E.2d 647, 650, 345 N.Y.S.2d 495, 499-500 (1973); State v. Thorson, 264 N.W.2d 441, 442 (N.D. 1978); Carrillo v. State, 591 S.W.2d 876, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).{/footnote}  Persons deemed accomplices include a prostitute in a prosecution of her "promoter,"{footnote}People v. Griffin, 83 App. Div.2d 180, 443 N.Y.S.2d 935 (4th Dep. 1981).{/footnote} and receivers of stolen goods.{footnote}Check 74 ALR3d 560.{/footnote}AmJur

2.  Accomplice Testimony Pursuant to a Plea Agreement

2(a).  Generally

Courts have long recognized that accomplices who are testifying for the prosecution after having entered into a plea agreement may be motivated to testify falsely against their co-defendants.{footnote}E.g., Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967); DuBose v. LeFevre, 619 F.2d 973, 979 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1045 (4th Cir. 1980).
State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 101, 685 P.2d 837, 842 (Ct. App. 1984); Glaze v. State, 565 P.2d 710, 712 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).{/footnote} Courts have declined to deem such testimony so unreliable as to be inadmissible per se,{footnote}Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917); Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 334 (1892); United States v. Peters, 791 F.2d 1270, 1300 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 168 (1986); United States v. Evans, 697 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983); United States v. Anderson, 654 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1127 (1981).
CHECK Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 227 (1941){/footnote} holding that the existence of a plea agreement goes to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility.{footnote}United States v. Gomez, 810 F.2d 947, 956 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2488 (1987); United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1257 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); United States v. Evans, 697 F.2d 240, 245 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086 (1983); United States v. McCallie, 554 F.2d 770, 772 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Borman, 437 F.2d 44, 45-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 913 (1971).{/footnote} A defendant must be allowed to impeach such testimony with evidence of any promises of leniency or favorable treatment made by the prosecution in return for the witness’ testimony.{footnote}Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).{/footnote}

2(b).  Contingent Plea Agreements

Some courts have held that a defendant’s Due Process rights are viuolated by testimony resulting from a plea agreement which suggests explicitly or implicitly that the accomplice must testify in a particular way.{footnote}People v. Medina, 41 Cal. App. 3d 438, 455, 116 Cal. Rptr. 133, 145 (1974); State v. Miller, 13 S.W. 832, 838 (Mo. 1890); Franklin v. State,  577 P.2d 860, 862 (Nev. 1978); Harris v. State, 15 Tex. Crim. 629, 634 (1883).
See also United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1133 (1st Cir. 1981) (dicta), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 (1983).{/footnote} The federal courts and some state courts, however, have found no violation of the defendant’s Due Process rights by plea agreements which were contingent upon the benefit received by the prosecution from the accomplice’s testimony,{footnote}United States v. Silvestri, 790 F.2d 186 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 197 (1986); United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1985) (no violation where agreement contingent on general value or benefit to prosecution of testimony); United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527, 1528 (1984) (finding violation where agreement contingent on further indictments), vacated en banc, No. 83-2159 (8th Cir. Sept. 20, 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985); U.S. v. Spector, 793 F.2d 932, 936-37 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 876 (1987); United States v. Kenney, 598 F. Supp. 874 (D. Me. 1984) (no violation where agreement also required testimony be truthful).
State v. O’Connor, 378 N.W.2d 248, 251-52 (S.D. 1985)
But see U.S. v. Baresh, 595 F. Supp. 1132 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (agreement contingent on testimony leading to arrest and indictment of two specified persons held to render accomplice testimony inadmissible).{/footnote} the “level of cooperation” by the accomplice,{footnote}U.S. v. Fallon, 776 F.2d 727, 733 (7th Cir. 1985).{/footnote} or the “adequacy” of the accomplice’s testimony.{footnote}U.S. v. Silvestri, 719 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).{/footnote}

2(c).  Sufficiency of Uncorroborated Accomplice Testimony

Uncorroborated accomplice testimony is generally deemed sufficient to sustain a conviction, {footnote}  Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 495 (1917); United States v. Moran, 151 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 19___); United States v. Fawcett, 115 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 19__); United States v. Sabin, 526 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lancaster, 44 F. 896 (___); United States v. Anderson, 654 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Cir. 1981); Moody v. United States, 376 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1967).
State v. Heno, 119 Conn. 29, 174 A. 181; State v. Carvelo, 45 Hawaii 16, 361 P.2d 45; Kelly v. people, 192 Ill. 119, 61 N.E. 425; Evans v. State, 165 Ind. 369, 74 N.E. 244, 75 N.E. 651; Commonwealth v. Holmes, 127 Mass. 424; Boutwell v. State, 165 Miss. 16, 143 So. 479; State v. Kuhlman, 152 Mo. 100, 53 S.W. 416; State v. Routzahn, 81 Neb. 133, 115 N.W. 759; State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533; State v. Hamm, 299 N.C. 519, 263 S.E.2d 556 (19___); State v. Brunette, 28 N.D. 539, 150 N.W. 271; State v. Reichert, 111 Ohio St. 698, 146 N.E. 386; Commonwealth v. De Masi, 234 Pa. 570, 83 A. 430; State v. Riddell, 38 R.I. 506, 96 A. 531; Taft v. Taft, 80 Vt. 256, 67 A. 703; State v. Gross, 31 Wash. 2d 202, 196 P.2d 297; Sparkman v. State, 27 Wis. 2d 92, 133 N.W.2d 776; State v. Alderilla, 37 Wyo. 478, 263 P. 616.{/footnote}  although a minority of states provide otherwise by statute{footnote}Ala. Code § 12-21-222 (1986) (applies to felonies only); Alaska Stat.  12.45.020 (1984); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-89-111(e)(1) (1977) (applies to felonies only); Cal. Penal Code § 1111 (1985); Ga. Code Ann. § 24-4-8 (1982) (rule applies to treason, perjury, and felonies, but only when accomplice is sole witness); Idaho Code § 19-2117 (1979); Iowa Code Ann. § 813.2 (R.20(3)) (West 1979 & Supp. 1990); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 634.04 (1983); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-16-213 (West 1985); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 175.291 (1985); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 60.22 (McKinney 1981); N.D. Cent. Code ‘  29-21-14 (1974); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 742 (West 1969); Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.440 (1984); P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34, App. II, R. 156 (Supp. 1988); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23A-22-8 (1979); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 38.14 (Vernon 1979)
See also Mobbs v. State, 307 Ark. 505, 821 S.W.2d 769 (1991); State v. Jones, 873 P.2d 122 (Idaho 1994); People v. Griffin, 83 App. Div.2d 180, 443 N.Y.S.2d 935 (4th Dep. 1981); Bolin v. State, 505 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Crim. 19___).
CHECK Howard v. State, 561 P.2d 125 (Okla. 1977); Alonzo v. State, 575 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Crim. 1979)(discussing exception to rule requiring corroboration).{/footnote} or judicial decision.{footnote}Turner v. State, 452 A.2d 416 (Md. 1982) (rule recognized judicially in Maryland); State v. Copeland, 677 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984).{/footnote}  States following the minority rule require some evidence which independently links the defendant to the crime.{footnote}Cunningham v. State, 312 So. 2d 62, 63-64 (Ala. App. 1975); Dimmick v. State, 473 P.2d 616, 617 (Alaska 1970); State v. Edwards, 665 P.2d 59, 67 (Ariz. 1983); State v. Jones, 873 P.2d 122 (Idaho 1994); State v. Pierce, 685 P.2d 837, 841 (Idaho 1984); State v. Vesey, 241 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Iowa 1976); Turner v. State, 452 A.2d 416 (Md. 1982) (accomplice’s own “excited utterance” held not to suffice); Thompson v. State, 691 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).{/footnote}  California law, for example, provides:

A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof.{footnote}Cal. Penal Code § 1111 (1985).{/footnote}

 Courts have held that the testimony of another accomplice will not suffice,{footnote}People v. Marshall, 273 Cal. App. 2d 423, 426, 78 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18 (1969); People v. Malone, 205 A.D. 257, 262, 199 N.Y.S. 646, 649 (1923); Rutledge v. State, 507 P.2d 551, 552 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Brown v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 352, 355, 320 S.W.2d 845, 847 (1959);{/footnote} and that nor will evidence which only the accomplice can authenticate.{footnote}People v. Bowley, 59 Cal. 2d 855, 861-62, 382 P.2d 591, 595-96, 31 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475-76 (1963); People v. Siegel, 282 A.D. 747, 748, 122 N.Y.S.2d 638, 639 (1953); Annotation, Corroboration of Accomplice Witness by Objective Evidence Authenticated by Same Accomplice, 96 A.L.R.2d 1185 (1964). {/footnote}

2(d).  Jury Instruction

Upon the defendant’s request, the court must instruct the jury to consider accomplice testimony with suspicion and caution.{footnote}Phelps v. U.S., 252 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1958) (reversing for failure to give instruction); United States v. Bernard, 625 F.2d 854 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Davis, 439 F.2d 1105 (9th Cir. 1971).
But see House v. State, 535 N.E.2d 103, 110 (Ind. 1989) (“The testimony of accomplices does not lack probative value as a matter of law, and their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony are questions properly left to the jury.”){/footnote} Failure to do so is generally held to constitute reversible error where there is no substantial corroborstion for the accomplice’s testimony.  On the other hand, failure to give the instruction is frequently held not to be reversible error,{footnote}Holmgren v. U.S., 217 U.S. 509, 524 (1910) (while acknowledging that “better practice” is to give instruction, holding failure to give instruction did not constitute grounds for reversal); United States v. Rosa, 560 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1977)(instruction only required where testimony incriminates defendant).
See also United States v. Brown, 454 F.2d 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1972) (plain error rule applied where defendant fails to request instruction).{/footnote} particularly where the accomplice testimony was corroborated.{footnote}Compare Tillery v. United States, 411 F.2d 644, 647-48 (5th Cir. 1969) (reversing where no corroboration); Phelps v. United States, 252 F.2d 49, 53-54 (5th Cir. 1958) (reversing where no corroboration); United States v. Hill, 627 F.2d 1052, 1053-55 (10th Cir. 1980) (reversing where insufficient corroboration) and Christy v. United States, 261 F.2d 357, 361 (9th Cir. 1958) (no reversal where "ample" corroboration).United States v. Williams, 463 F.2d 393, 395-96 (10th Cir. 1972) (no reversal where "considerable" corroboration); United States v. Lee, 506 F.2d 111, 120 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (no reversal where testimony "materially" corroborated).{/footnote}

Where an accomplice’s hearsay statement has been deemed an adoptive admission by the defendant, it has been held unnecessary to instruct the jury that the accomplice’s statement must be viewed with distrust.{footnote}People v. Silva, 754 P.2d 1070, 1080 (Cal. 1988).{/footnote}  See also ADMISSIONS § 4.  Adoptive Admissions.

3.  Testimony for the Defense

 In Washington v. Texas,{footnote}388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967).{/footnote} the Court struck down a Texas law that prohibited accomplices in a crime from testifying for one another, under the Compulsory Process Clause.  See also COMPULSORY PROCESS CLAUSE.

Bibliography

3 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (13th ed. § 649 19__);
Yvette A. Beeman, Accomplice Testimony Under Contingent Plea Agreements, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 800 (1987).
Derek J. T. Adler, Ex Post Facto Limitations On Changes In Evidentiary Law: Repeal Of Accomplice Corroboration Requirements, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 1191 (1987)
Welsh S. White, Accomplices’ Confessions And The Confrontation Clause, 4 Wm. & Mary Bill of Rts. J. 753 (1996).
Christine J. Saverda, Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for Increased Evidentiary Standards, 100 Yale L.J. 785 (1990).