See also: ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT; ATTORNEYS
PRIVILEGES.

1. Generally

The federal courts and all of the states recognize a privilege protecting the confidentiality of communications between attorneys and clients.  While these privilege rules take many forms, Proposed FRE 503 is representative. It states the essence of the privilege:

A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client….{footnote}Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972), Proposed Rule 503.{/footnote}

Proposed FRE 503 was rejected by Congress along with a number of other specific privilege rules in favor of a general rule granting federal courts discretion to recognize privileges "in the light of reason and experience."{footnote}FRE 501.  See also Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 [(____)](Rule 501 requires federal courts to "continue the evolutionary developmen of testimonial privileges).
See PRIVILEGES § 1.{/footnote} Many states, however, have adopted the proposed FRE 503 either verbatim or with variations,{footnote}Ala. R. Evid. 502; Alaska R. Evid. 503 (1995); Ark. R. Evid. 502; Haw. R. Evid. 503 (1993); Idaho R. Evid. 502; Me. R. Evid. 502; N.M. R.A. Rule 11-503 (A)(4) (1996); Ore. Evid. Code 503; Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 503; Wis. Stat. § 905.03 (1993-94).{/footnote} and federal  courts have referred to it for guidance.{footnote}E.g., In re: Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9840 (8th Cir. 1997).{/footnote} States not adopting proposed FRE 513 have retained their versions of the privilege in either statutory or common law form.{footnote}Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2234; Cal. Evid. C. §§ 954 (West 1966); Fla. § 90.502; Ga. Code Ann. § 24-9-21 (Michie Co. 1982); Ind. Code § 34-1-14-5; Kan. § 60-426; Minn. Stat. § 595.02, subd. 1(b) (1996); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 491-060 (West 1994); Nev. § 49.075; N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 353; N.Y. CPLR 4503 [a]; Penn. S.S.A. § 5916; S.C. Code Ann. § 19-11-10 (Law. Co-op 1985); Wash. Rev. C.W. 5.60.060(2); W. Va. R. Evid. 501 (privileges governed by common law); McDonald’s Corp. v. Levine, 439 N.E.2d 475 (Ill. App. 1982); State v. Toscano, 100 A.2d 170 (N.J. 1953); State v. Jarvis, 483 S.E.2d 38 (W. Va. 1996).
{/footnote}  While states also have canons of ethics which protect confidential communications, these canons do not affect the evidentiary privilege.{footnote}In re: Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9840 (8th Cir. 1997).
In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 602 A.2d 1220 (Md. 1992).{/footnote}

In Upjohn Co. v. United States,{footnote}449 U.S. 383 (1981).{/footnote} the Supreme Court stated that the attorney-client privilege exists "to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice."{footnote}Id. at 389, quoted in Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 141 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1998).
Accord Anderson v. State, 297 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. App. 1974); Huie v. Deschazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex. 1996); Dietz v. Doe, 935 P.2d 611 (Wash. 1997); State ex re. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Bedell, 484 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1997).
See generally 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961).{/footnote} The privilege is construed narrowly, however:{footnote}{/footnote}

The privilege remains an exception to the general duty to disclose.  Its  benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete. . . . It is worth preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it  is nonetheless an obstacle to the investigation of the truth.  It ought to be strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.{footnote}8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
Accord United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158 (11th Cir. 1987).
Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Mental Retardation, 677 N.E.2d 127 (Mass. 1997); Austin v. State,  934 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
See also In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 898 F.2d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 1990) (because privilege keeps relevant information from fact finder, it should be applied only where necessary to achieve its purpose).
See also State v. Ogle, 682 P.2d 267, 270 (Ore. 1984) ("privilege protects only those disclosures which might not have been made absent the privilege")
But see Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997):

This is not a case in which our traditional view that testimonial privileges should be construed strictly should be applied. A strict construction of the privilege that would leave a gap between the circumstances in which the crime-fraud exception applies and the circumstances in which a communication is protected by the attorney-client privilege would make no sense.
Id. at ___ (client told legal services attorney of his intent to commit arson and issue in case was whether crime-fraud exception applied).{/footnote}

2.  Choice of Law

2(a).  Federal Courts

Under FRE 501, federal courts look to federal common law in deciding privilege issues in criminal cases, in civil cases where a federal question is involved, or where a constitutional privilege is asserted.  In diversity cases, the federal courts apply state law insofar as the relevant claim or defense is controlled by state law.  Where there is a choice of law to be made, the court applies the choice of law rules of the forum state.  See PRIVILEGE 2. Choice of Law.

2(b). State Choice of Law Rules

There is a split of authority as to whether privileges are procedural or substantive law. See PRIVILEGE § 2.  Choice of Law.  If procedural, then the law of the forum state will be applied.  Ordinarily this will be wherever the trial court sits, but not always: where the privilege is asserted in proceedings to compel compliance with a subpoena served in another state, and a local court (federal or state) is called upon to rule, that court may apply local law as the law of the "forum".
 
Under the Restatement of Conflicts 2d, the law of the state with the most significant contacts with the communication applies to the question of admissibility, unless there is some countervailing policy in the forum state. {footnote}__ Restatement 2d (Conflicts) ‘ ___ (19__).{/footnote}  See PRIVILEGE 2.  Choice of Law.

3.  Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship

3(a).  Generally

One asserting the privilege must first establish the existence of an attorney-client relationship.{footnote}Ex Parte Gonzalez, 686 So.2d 204, 207 (Ala. 1996); Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262 (Ind. 1996); Dietz v. Doe, 935 P.2d 611 (Wash. 1997).{/footnote}  It is not sufficient for the attorney to simply state the legal conclusion that such a relationship existed.{footnote}DiCenzo v. Izawa, 723 P.2d 171 (Haw. 1986); Dietz v. Doe, 935 P.2d 611 (Wash. 1997).
Paul R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege In The United States § 11:10 at 978-81 (1993).{/footnote}   It must be shown that at the time of the communication, the purported “client” it was being rendered legal services by the attorney, or was consulting with the attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal services from the attorney.{footnote}U.S. v. Demauro, 581 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir. 1978).
Ala. R. Evid. 502(a)(1) (definition of “client”); People v. Bennett, 810 P.2d 661, 664 (Colo. 1991); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 801 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Idaho 19___); Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Ind. 1996) (communications with paralegal for purposes of obtaining advice from an attorney with paralegal’s law firm held privileged); People v. Allen, 666 N.E.2d 1351 (N.Y. 1996) (defendant’s telephone conversation with former attorney in which he acknowledged fraudulently using the attorney’s notary stamp not privileged).{/footnote}  A commonly-cited test for the existence of the relationship in this context states:

An attorney-client relationship may be implied "when (1) a person seeks advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or assistance sought pertains to matters within the attorney’s professional competence, and (3) the attorney expressly or impliedly agrees to give or actually gives the desired advice or assistance.{footnote}Kurtenbach v. TeKippe, 260 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Iowa 1977).
See also Devaux v. American Home Assurance Co., 444 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Mass. 1983) (quoting Kurtenbach); Todd v. State, 931 P.2d 721 (Nev. 1997) (same); State v. Gordon, 1997 N.H. LEXIS 25 (same) (statements by defendant to his college paralegal instructor, who was a lawyer, regarding a past rape were not privileged because defendant was not seeking instructor’s advice in her legal capacity).{/footnote}

The privilege may attach where there is no litigation pending or contemplated.{footnote}Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262 (Ind. 1996).{/footnote}  The privilege may also attach where no actual legal representation follows the consultation{footnote}Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1997) (in context of motion to disqualify).{/footnote} and where no fee has been paid.{footnote}Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262 (Ind. 1996).{/footnote} Courts have also applied the privilege where the client reasonably but mistakenly believed that a lawyer represented the client rather than another party.{footnote}United States v. Hart, No. Crim. A. 92-219, 1992 WL 348425, at * 1-2 (E.D. La. Nov. 6, 1992).
See also Wylie v. Marley Co., 891 F.2d 1463, 1471-72 (10th Cir. 1989) (no abuse of discretion in district court’s application of privilege where relationship of employee to employer’s attorney was confusing). {/footnote}

Non-party witnesses commonly consult with one or both of the parties’ attorneys in preparation for the witness’ upcoming  deposition.  Courts have held these consultations privileged.{footnote}Ex Parte City of Leeds, 677 So.2d 1171, 1173-74 (Ala. 1996) (former mayor’s consultation with city attorney); Ex Parte Time Ins. Co., 646 So.2d 583 (Ala. 1994) (consultation between defendant’s attorney and investigator hired by defendant). {/footnote} 

4.  Members of the Privileged Relationship

4(a).  Organizations Generally

 For purposes of the privilege, a “client” may be a person or an entity,{footnote}E.g., Ala. R. Evid. 502(a)(1); N.J.R.E. 504(3); Payton v. New Jerset Turnpike Authority, 691 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1997) (turnpike authority a “client”).{/footnote} such as a corporation.{footnote}Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass’n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).{/footnote}  Where the communication at issue is that of an officer or employee of a client corporation or other public or private entity, a privilege is generally held to attach only where the officer or employee was authorized or directed to make the communication.{footnote}Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (rejecting "control group" limitation imposed by some lower federal courts). 
But see D.I. Chadbourne Inc. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. 2d 723 (1964) (communications outside scope of duties not privileged, even if at employer’s direction).{/footnote}  So long as the communication was made on behalf of the entity, the "holder" of the privilege in such cases is the entity, not the individual officer or employee.{footnote}In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jackier), 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich. 1977).{/footnote}  Corporate documents that are subject to the attorney-client privilege may be withheld from shareholders.{footnote}Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., 932 P.2d 490 (N.M. 1997).
CHECK Riser v. Genuine Parts Co., 150 Ga. App. 502, 258 S.E.2d 184, 186 (Ga. App. 1979){/footnote}

Some states employ a "control group" analysis to determine whether a communication is privileged.{footnote}E.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 1982).
Contra Samaritan Found, v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 877 (Ariz. 1993).{/footnote} The control group consiste of top management and all persons whose opinion is consulted by organizational decision makers. Only communications between an attorney and a member of the organization’s control group are privileged. Persons who merely supply information for the organization are not considered within the control group.{footnote}Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Koppers Co., 485 N.E.2d 1301 (Ill. App. 1985) (product engineer not within control group).{/footnote}  The “control group” test was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Upjohn, and is therefore inapplicable under the federal common law privilege.{footnote}449 U.S. at 392-97.{/footnote}

Attorneys for a partnership are held to represent all of the partners as to matters of partnership business, and therefore the privilege cannot be asserted by the partnership or its attorney to prevent a partner from discovering communications relating to partnership business.{footnote}Roberts v. Heim, 123 F.R.D. 614, 625 (N.D.Cal. 1988).
Wortham & Van Liew v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. App. 3d 927, 932, 233 Cal. Rptr. 725, 728 (1987); Rice v. Strunk, 670 N.E.2d 1280, 1285 (Ind. 1996) (dicta).
Contra Quintel Corp. V. Citibank, N.A., 589 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). {/footnote}

4(a)(2).  Governmental Entities

For purposes of the privilege, a “client” may be a governmental body such as the federal government, a state,{footnote}Hearn v. Rhay, 68 FRD 574 (D.C. Wash. 1975).{/footnote} city{footnote}See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 886 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1989) (federal grand jury subpoena served upon Detroit city government).{/footnote} or some other unit of government.{footnote}In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Farber), 574 A.2d 449 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (privilege applicable to county agency).
Proposed FRE 503, Advisory Committee’s Note ("the definition of ‘client’ includes governmental bodies."); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 124 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) ("The attorney-client privilege extends to a communication of a governmental organization.").{/footnote}  The privilege has been recognized in civil litigation. {footnote}Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F. Supp. 489, 498-500 (E.D. Pa.) (Magistrate Judge) (dicta), aff’d, 943 F. Supp. 501 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Donovan v. Teamsters Union Local 25, 103 F.R.D. 550, 552-53 (D. Mass. 1984); SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 92 F.R.D. 65, 66-67 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Jupiter Painting Contracting Co. v. United States, 87 F.R.D. 593, 598 (E.D. Pa. 1980); Thill Sec. Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., 57 F.R.D. 133, 138-39 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Detroit Screwmatic Co. v. United States, 49 F.R.D. 77, 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Anderson, 34 F.R.D. 518, 522-23 (D. Colo. 1963); cf. In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 600 n.8 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting that private party did not challenge applicability of privilege to government agency); Mitzner v. Sobol, 136 F.R.D. 359, 360-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (suggesting that state agency may assert privilege) (dicta); Bruce v. Christian, 113 F.R.D. 554, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that city agency may assert privilege); State ex rel. Babbitt v. Arnold, 26 Ariz. App. 333, 548 P.2d 426, 428 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that county may assert privilege). {/footnote}

Uniform Rule 502 limits the governmental privilege to cases involving a pending investigation or litigation and requires a finding by the court that disclosure will "seriously impair" the government’s pursuit of the investigation or litigation.{footnote}Unif. R. Evid. 502(d)(6).{/footnote}
 

4(b).  The Attorney

The privilege only extends to communications with an attorney or an attorney’s agent.{footnote}U.S. v. Bein, 728 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1984) (communication with non-lawyer not privileged).{/footnote}  An attorney need not be licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the communication took place for the privilege to apply.{footnote}Powell v. Western Illinois Electric Cooperative, 180 Ill. App. 3d 581, 536 N.E.2d 231 (4th Dist. 1990), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1132.{/footnote}  A communication to one who is reasonably but mistakenly believed to be an attorney has been held privileged.{footnote}United States v. Mullen & Co., 776 F. Supp. 620, 621 (D. Mass. 1991) (dicta); United States v. Tyler, 745 F. Supp. 423, 425-26 (W.D. Mich. 1990); United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 517, 523 (D. Del. 1981) (dicta).
But see Dabney v. Investment Corp. of America, 82 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (no privilege attached to communication with unsupervised law student).{/footnote}  Legal advice given by someone other than an attorney is not privileged.{footnote}United States v. Bein, 728 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1984).{/footnote}  In-house counsel are treated no differently than outside counsel for the purpose of the attorney-client privilege.{footnote}Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 FRD 361 (D.C. Del. 1975).
CHECK Nakajima v. General Motors Corp., 857 F. Supp. 100 (D.D.C. 1994).{/footnote}  It has been held that no attorney-client privilege applies where an attorney acts as a business agent for the client.{footnote}United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1980).{/footnote}

The privilege extends to all members of a firm which represents a client.{footnote}Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1984).{/footnote}

4(c).  Communications Through Agents

The attorney-client privilege extends beyond just communications made directly by the client to the attorney, or directly by the attorney to the client.  Subject to certain limitations, it generally extends to communications made by or to employees or agents of either.{footnote}See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961); 53 ALR 369 (1928);

8 Wigmore §§ 2301, 2317-1. 

Check State v. Kociolek, 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957).
Check Federal Trade Comm. v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 202 App.D.C. 207 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Check People v. Knippenberg, 66 Ill. 2d 276 (1977).{/footnote} Agents whose communications may be deemed privileged include a client’s liability insurance carrier,{footnote}People v. Alotes, 60 Cal. 2d 723 (1964); Dari v. Uniroyal, 41 Ill. App. 3d 122, 353 N.E.2d 298 (1st Dist. 1976)(communication between insuror and insured privileged if it is to be passed along to insuror’s counsel); Chavez v. Watts, 161 Ill. App. 3d 664, 515 N.E.2d 146 (1st Dist. 1987)(statement made by insured to insuror privileged). {/footnote} accountants,{footnote}United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982).

But see Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 939 (9th Cir. 1949)(holding?). {/footnote} paralegals,{footnote}See Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Ind. 1996) (communications with paralegal for purposes of obtaining advice from an attorney with paralegal’s law firm held privileged).{/footnote} physicians,{footnote}Edney v. Smith, 425 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D.N.Y. 1976)(G); City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951)(G);  check 25 ALR2d 1418 (1951).{/footnote} psychiatrist{footnote}People v. Knuckles, No. 2-90-0893 (2d Dist. Ill.)(psychiatrist hired by criminal defendant but not called to testify).{/footnote} and interpreters.{footnote}See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1961)(dictum).{/footnote}  The privilege only attaches to communications which are for the purpose of facilitating the rendering of legal services by the attorney.{footnote}Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, 669 N.E.2d 165, 169 n. 8 (Ind. 1996). {/footnote}  Thus, where the purpose of communications involving an accountant is the rendering of accounting advice, there is no attorney-client privilege.{footnote}Gariepy v. United States, 189 F.2d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 1951); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795, 805-06 (9th Cir. 1954); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 658 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1981).

United States v. Cote, 326 F. Supp. 444 (D.C. Minn. 1971); United States v. Schmidt, 343 F. Supp. 444 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
But see ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, supra.{/footnote} Moreover, the communication must relate to the same subject matter about which the attorney was retained.{footnote}Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, 669 N.E.2d 165, 169 n. 8 (Ind. 1996).{/footnote}

4(d).  Multiple Parties with Common Interests

Communications among attorneys and clients in a matter of common interest are generally considered privileged. {footnote}United States v. Bay State Ambulance & Hospital Rental Service, Inc., 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989); Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Stotts, 870 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1981) (presence of informant at joint defense meeting between codefendants and their counsel rendered communications non-privileged); U.S. v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979); Hunydee v. U.S., 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965); SMC Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508 (D.C. Conn. 1976); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Etc., 406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (communication between codefendants was confidential, concerned common issues, and intended to facilitate representation in SEC investigation).
Tex. R. Evid. 503(d)(5).
2 Weinstein’s Evidence, & 503(b)[06] (1980).
But see United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1981) (presence of informant at joint defense meeting between codefendants and their counsel rendered communications non-privileged).{/footnote}    The privilege applies so long as there is actual or potential litigation, and the communication must be treated as confidential within the group.{footnote}CHECK U.S. v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1085 n. 4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971).{/footnote}  If litigation arises between them, the privilege is lost,{footnote}141 ALR 553.{/footnote} but not as to third parties.{footnote}Doll v. Loesel, 136 A. 796 (Pa. 1927); Cal. § 912.{/footnote}

Similarly, a client-to-attorney communication may be disclosed by the attorney to an attorney for a co-defendant without the privilege being lost.{footnote}Waller v. Financial Corp. of America, 828 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1987).{/footnote}

4(e).  Communications by Trustees and Other Fiduciaries

An exception to the attorny-client privilege has in some cases been recognized to allow beneficiaries to discover communications between the trustee and the trustee’s attorney.{footnote}Wildbur v. ARCO Chemical Co., 974 F.2d 631 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Evans, 796 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1986).
In the matter of Torian, 564 S.W.2d 521 (Ark. 1978); Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709 (Del. Ch. 1976); In re Hoehl’s Estate, 193 N.W. 514 (Wis. 1923).
See generally Report of the Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility–Counselling the Fiduciary, 28 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 823 (1994) (concluding that trustee’s attorney should be able to disclose otherwise privileged matters to beneficiaries if necessary to protect trust estate).
See also Bogart, The Law Of Trusts And Trustees, § 961 (2nd. ed. 1983); Scott, The Law Of Trusts, § 173 (3rd ed. 1967).{/footnote}  Some courts have extended this concept to other fiduciaries where “good cause” is shown for setting aside the privilege.{footnote}See generally Comment, Developments In The Law — Privileged Communications: III. Attorney-Client Privilege, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1501, 1524-1529 (1985).
But see Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington Star Co., 543 F. Supp. 906, 909 n.5 (D.D.C. 1982) (no showing of “good cause” required).
{/footnote}  For example, shareholders in derivative actions against an officer or director of the corporation have been allowed to discover pre-litigation communications between the officer or director and the corporation’s attorney regarding the corporate actions which are the subject of the suit, where “good cause” is shown.{footnote}Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1101 (5th Cir. 1970); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 722 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 214 & n. ?? (N.D. Ill. 1972); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D 595, 606-07 (N.D. Tex 1981); Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., [1976-1977 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P95,894, at 91,303 (N.D. Tex. 1977);. {/footnote}  The exception has also been applied to suits by limited partners against a general partner,{footnote}Quintel Corp., N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., 567 F. Supp. 1357, 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).{/footnote} suits by beneficiaries of an employee benefit plan against the trustee,{footnote}Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild v. Washington Star Co., 543 F. Supp. 906, 909 n.5 (D.D.C. 1982).
Riggs Nat’l Bank v. Zimmer, 355 A.2d 709, 712-14 (Del. Ch. 1976).
See also Donovan v, Fitzsimmons, 90 F.R.D. 583, 587 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (exception applied to action by Secretary of Labor on behalf of beneficiaries).{/footnote} and suits by union members against a union official.{footnote}Boswell v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 106 L.R.R.M. 2713, 2714 (D.N.J. 1981).{/footnote}  On the other hand, some courts have rejected attempts by beneficiaries to obtain disclosure of communications between trustees and the trustees’ attorneys.{footnote}In re Long Island Lighting Co., 129 F.3d 268 (1997) (privilege may be successfully asserted by plan sponsor as to communications which did not implicate fiduciary duties).
Shannon v. Superior Court, 217 Cal. App. 3d 986, 266 Cal. Rptr. 242, 246 (1990); Huie v. Deschazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923-24 (Tex. 1996).
CHECK In re Prudence-Bonds Corp., 76 F. Supp. 643, 647 (E.D.N.Y. 1948), aff’d, 174 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949).{/footnote}

The burden of showing “good cause” is generally held to be on the beneficiary.{footnote}In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D 595, 606-07 (N.D. Tex 1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 722 (N.D. Ill. 1978); Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., [1976-1977 Decisions] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P95,894, at 91,303 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 211, 214 & n. ?? (N.D. Ill. 1972); Cohen v. Uniroyal, 80 F.R.D. 480, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
Contra Valente v. Pepsi Co, 68 F.R.D. 361, 367 (D. Del. 1975) (burden on corpoeate officer or director).{/footnote}  Communications for the purpose of defending the allegedly wrongful action in connection with litigation retain the privilege.{footnote}Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 80 F.R.D. 718, 724 (N.D. Ill. 1978); In re LTV Sec. Litig. 89 F.R.D 595, 607-08 (N.D. Tex 1981).{/footnote}

Some courts, while rejecting this “fiduciary” exception to the privilege, have applied the “crime-fraud” exception to determine whether communications of corporate officers or directors should be divulged.{footnote}Hoiles v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 204 Cal. Rptr. 111, 114-15 (Ct. App. 1984); Dickerson v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 99-100, 185 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100-01 (Ct. App. 1982); {/footnote}

5.  The Scope of Matters Privileged

5(a). Communications

5(a)(1).  Generally

The majority rule is that the privilege protects not only clients’ communications to attorneys, but also attorneys’ communications to clients.{footnote}In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 803 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1986); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dept. of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 199 App. D.C. 272 (D.C.Cir. 1980); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574 (D.C. Wash. 1975).
Austin v. State,  934 S.W.2d 672, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); State ex re. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Bedell, 484 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1997) (privilege protects “confidential communications made by a client or an attorney to one another”).
Contra Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. School Dist. of Sheboygan Falls, 546 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Wis. 1996) (generally communications from attorney to client not privileged; exception applies where attorney communication “would indirectly reveal the substance of the [client’s] confidential communications to its lawyer”).
{/footnote}  Generally only communications, not facts, may be privileged from disclosure.{footnote}Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 454 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, __U.S.__, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984).
State ex re. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Bedell, 484 S.E.2d 199 n. 11 (W. Va. 1997)
8 J. Wigmore, § 2285, at 527.
See also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) ("The privilege only protects disclosure of communications; it does not protect disclosure of the underlying facts by those who communicated with the attorney. . . ").{/footnote}  A fact does not become privileged merely by communicating it to an attorney.{footnote}Huie v. Deschazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996).{/footnote} One court illustrated the distinction between communications and facts as follows:

Assume that a trustee who has misappropriated money from a trust confidentially reveals this fact to his or her attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. The trustee, when asked at trial whether he or she misappropriated money, cannot claim the attorney-client privilege. The act of misappropriation is a material fact of which the trustee has knowledge independently of the communication. The trustee must therefore disclose the fact (assuming no other privilege applies), even though the trustee confidentially conveyed the fact to the attorney. However, because the attorney’s only knowledge of the misappropriation is through the confidential communication, the attorney cannot be called on to reveal this information.{footnote}Huie v. Deschazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. 1996).{/footnote}

5(a)(2). Actions or Observations as Privileged

Generally, visual observations by the attorney relating to the client are not privileged,{footnote}Manning v. State, 766 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. App. 1989) (attorney’s testimony concerning observations he made did not violate the attorney-client privilege), aff’d per curiam, 773 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Cr.App. 1989); Brasfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288, 295 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980) (former attorney’s testimony regarding client’s location on a particular afternoon did not violate attorney-client privilege).
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2306 (McNaughton rev. 1961):

On the one hand, then, those data which would have come to the attorney’s notice in any event, by mere observation, without any action on the client’s part – such as the color of his hat or the pattern of his shoe… are not any part of the communications of the client. . . ").{/footnote} including observations of the client’s physical or mental state.{footnote}Oliver v. Warren, 16 Cal. App. 164 (1911); People v. Burgess, 1997 Ill. LEXIS 47 (Ill. 1997) (no violation of privilege where defendant’s attorney in hearing on his client’s fitness to stand trial testifies to client’s demeanor based on observations; privilege does not allow attorney to testify as to the defendant’s mental condition based on privileged communications).
Contra Taylor v. Sheldon, 173 N.E.2d 892 (Ohio 1961).{/footnote} A client’s actions which, even though nonverbal, are in the nature of communications to the attorney, have been held privileged.{footnote}Anderson v. State, 297 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. App. 1974).
Mccormick On Evidence at § 89 (“A confidential communication may be made by acts as well as by words, as if the client rolled up his sleeve to show the lawyer a hidden scar, or opened the drawer of his desk to         show a revolver there.”){/footnote}  Conversely, actions not intended as communications are not privileged.{footnote}8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2306 (McNaughton rev. 1961).{/footnote}  Courts have generally held that a client’s act of turning over allegedly stolen goods or a weapon allegedly used in a crime is privileged.{footnote}  Anderson v. State, 297 So. 2d 871, 875 (Fla. App. 1974) (stolen dictaphone and calculator given to attorney’s receptionist); State v. Olwell,  394 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964) (prosecution in murder case may require attorney to turn over knife given him by client but may not introduce into evidence source of knife).
But see Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538 (Ky.1970) (no privilege applied where accused asked attorney to turn merchandise over to police because of attorney’s close relationship with police; attorney merely being used as agent or conduit).{/footnote} 

5(a)(2).  Documents and Things

A privileged communication may be either oral or in writing, but documents and things are not rendered privileged merely because they were passed between client and attorney for the purpose of rendering legal services.{footnote}Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976); Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969)(cancelled checks and bank statements); United States v. Kelly, 311 F. Supp. 1216 (E.D. Pa. 1969)(accountant’s work papers).

Collette v. Sarrasin, 184 Cal. 283 (1920).{/footnote}  To be privileged, a document or thing (e.g., a model) must have been created for the attorney by the client, or vice versa (see ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT).

5(a)(3).  Facts Relating to Representation

Consistent with the general rule that only communications, not facts, may be privileged from disclosure, the fact that someone retained or spoke to an attorney is generally not privileged.{footnote}See 84 ALR Fed. 852.

But see United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(Sixth Amendment right to counsel precluded government from introducing fact that defendant obtained counsel near time that crime discovered).{/footnote} 

5(a)(3)(i).  Identity of the Client

An attorney is ordinarily not privileged to refuse to identify his or her client.{footnote}In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (not privileged absent “special circumstances”); Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1948); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev’g 663 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984).
Hays v. Wood, 603 P.2d 19 (Cal. 1979); State v. Bean, 239 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Iowa 1976); D’Alessio v. Gilberg, 205 A.D.2d 8, 617 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1994); Dietz v. Doe, 935 P.2d 611 (Wash. 1997).
Mccormick On Evidence § 90, pp. 185-1868 (2d ed. 1972); Wigmore, Evidence § 2313 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); 81 Am.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 213, pp. 244-246; 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 283e, pp. 802-803; Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1047; Annot., 114 A.L.R. 1321.{/footnote}  Three exceptions have been recognized by various courts, however.{footnote}See generally Comment, Developments In The Law — Privileged Communication: III. Attorney-Client Privilege, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1501, 1514-1524 (1985).{/footnote} Some courts have held that a client’s identity will be deemed privileged where disclosure would implicate the client in the matter for which the client sought legal advice from the attorney (the “legal advice” exception).{footnote}In re Grand Jury Investigations, 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981); In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1, 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir. 1982), withdrawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 641 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 453 n.7 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984); In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 898 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1990) (identity of a client who sought advice regarding his involvement in conspiracy held privileged); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960) (attorney who made anonymous payment of back taxes in order for client to reduce exposure to criminal liability subpoenaed by IRS for identity of client); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 689 F.2d 1351, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982).
D’Alessio v. Gilberg, 205 A.D.2d 8, 617 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1994); Dietz v. Doe, 935 P.2d 611 (Wash. 1997).
But see United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984);
CHECK Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965); In re Grand Jury Witness, 695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982); In Re Kaplan, 8 N.Y.2d 214, 203 N.Y.S.2d 836, 168 N.E.2d 660 (1960).{/footnote} Others hold that the privilege will be recognized where disclosure would provide the “last link” in a chain of incriminating evidence likely to lead to criminal charges against the client.{footnote}In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
Ex Parte DCH Regional Med. Ctr., 683 So.2d 409, 410-11 (Ala. 1996) (compelling disclosure of person who supplied attorney with tape recording of meeting where insufficient showing of attorney-client relationship and that disclosure would implicate client in a crime); Ex Parte Enzor, 117 So.2d 361, 362 (Ala. 1060).
See also Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 633 (9th Cir. 1960) (stating that the client’s identity "may well be the link that could form the chain of testimony necessary to convict" him).
Contra United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807, 810 n.2 (3d Cir. 1984) (rejected this use of privilege); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983) (same).
CHECK In re Grand Jury Proceedings 88-9, 899 F.2d 1039, 1044 (11th Cir. 1990) (exception inapplicable when disclosure would not reveal privileged communications, motive, or strategy).{/footnote}  Finally, some courts have recognized the privilege where the underlying communication has already been disclosed, and disclosing the client’s identity would reveal the client as a party to the communication and thereby invade the privilege.{footnote}United States v. Strahl, 590 F.2d 10, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1978) (adopting both the legal advice and communication exceptions), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979); In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637-38 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Empanelled Feb. 14, 1978, 603 F.2d 469, 473 (3d Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 905 (4th Cir. 1965); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 452-54 (6th Cir. 1983) (adopting both the legal advice and the communication exceptions), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984); In re Witness Before the Special Mar. 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489, 494 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Osterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591, 593-94 (9th Cir. 1983; Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1981); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 1960).
Willis v. Superior Court, 112 Cal.App.3d 277, 291, 169 Cal.Rptr. 301 (1980); State v. Bean, 239 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Iowa 1976).
 CHECK United States v. Tratner, 511 F.2d 248 (7th Cir. 1975); Colman v. Heidenreich, 381 N.E.2d 866, 871 (1978){/footnote}

Even where one of these exceptions applies, the client’s identity will not be privilege where the underlying communication was for the purpose of furthering a future or continuing crime or fraud.{footnote}In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 722 F.2d 303, 308 (6th Cir. 1983) (identities of clients, anonymous owners of corporation under investigation not privileged), cert. denied, __U.S.___, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1977).
But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 641 F.2d 199, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1981) (identity of client privileged because no prima facie showing of crime or fraud made).{/footnote}  See 5(c), supra.

5(a)(3)(ii).  Fees and Billing Information

Facts relating to a client’s fees are also generally unprotected by the privilege,{footnote}In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (not privileged absent “special circumstances”); United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc); United States v. Haddad, 527 F.2d 537, 538 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976); United States v. Jeffers, 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Hirsch, 803 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 695 F.2d 363, 365 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 896 F.2d 1267, 1269-75 (11th Cir. 1990).

In re: Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q (Maryland Ct.App. 1992); Seventh Elect Church v. Rogers, 688 P.2d 506 (Wash. 1984) (amount, source, and manner of payment of legal fees not privileged because they do not convey the substance of confidential communications between attorney and client); State v. Sheppard, 763 P.2d 1232 (Wash. App. 1988) (fee arrangements with clients and source of clients’ funds not privileged).
See generally Stern & Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney Subpoena Propblem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. Pa. L. REV. 1783, 1798-1800 (1988); Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Federal Grand Jury: Client’s Identity and Fee Arrangements, 13 Am. J. Crim. L. 67, 67-68 (1985).{/footnote}[516] although courts have recognized the “legal advice” exception{footnote}See § 5(a)(3)(i).  Identity of the Client, supra.{/footnote} in this context as well, where disclosure of the information would implicate the client in the matter for which the client was seeking legal advice.{footnote}In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 898 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1990) (identity of individual who paid legal fees for defendant in narcotics conspiracy trial held privileged); In re Witnesses before Special March 1980 Grand Jury, 729 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1984); Tornay v. United States, 840 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Witness, 695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982).

But see United States v. Sims,  845 F.2d 1564 (11th Cir. 1988)(exception inapplicable where prosecution was already aware of lawyer;s and client’s identities).
But see Seventh Elect Church v. Rogers, 688 P.2d 506 (Wash. 1984) (recognizing “legal advice” exception but finding it inapplicable; amount, source, and manner of payment of legal fees not privileged because they do not convey the substance of confidential communications between attorney and client); State v. Sheppard, 763 P.2d 1232 (Wash. App. 1988) (recognizing “legal advice” exception but finding it inapplicable; fee arrangements with clients and source of clients’ funds not privileged).{/footnote}[518]

Billing statements are not privileged to the extent that they merely reflect the actions an attorney took, the dates on which the action was taken and the time spent.{footnote}Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1962) (no privilege for date and general nature of services performed); Westhemeco Ltd. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 82 F.R.D. 702, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Cohen v. Uniroyal, Inc., 80 F.R.D. 480, 483 (E.D. Pa. 1978); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595, 603 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., 932 P.2d 490 (N.M. 1997).{/footnote}

5(b). Purpose of Facilitating Legal Services

‘5(b)(1).  Generally

Not every communication to one’s attorney is a privileged attorney-client communication.{footnote}State v. Marshall, 690 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1997).{/footnote}  The privilege only extends to communications for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services.{footnote}U.S. v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) (communication must be "for the purpose of securing primarily either [i] an opinion on law or [ii] legal services or [iii] assistance in some legal proceeding").
Cal. § 952; Judge Rotenberg Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. Commissioner of the Dept. of Mental Retardation, 677 N.E.2d 127 (Mass. 1997); State v. Marshall, 690 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1997) (where attorney had declined to represent defendant on criminal charges, communications releating murder not privileged); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 118 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1996) (communication must be "for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance"); 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).{/footnote}  Communications with an attorney for a purpose other than the rendition of legal services, such as the rendering of accounting advice{footnote}Clayton v. Canida, 223 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. 1949).
See also ACCOUNTANT-CLIENT PRIVILEGE.{/footnote} or business advice,{footnote}Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1987); Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 FRD 361 (D.C. Del. 1975)(in-house counsel); Barr Marine Products Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

CNR Investments Inc. v. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank, 115 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 451 N.E.2d 580 (3d Dit. 1983).
McCormick on Evidence § 88, 322-24 (Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (consultation of attorney as business advisor or agent not necessarily privileged).

CHECK In re Fischel, 557 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1977).{/footnote} are not covered by the attorney-client privilege.{footnote}Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro, Inc., 667 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1981).{/footnote}  Thus, it has been held that where an attorney is being engaged to prepare the client’s tax return, the services are in nateure of accounting services and communications relating thereto are not within the attorney-client privilege.{footnote}United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981); Canaday v. United States, 354 F.2d 849, 857 (8th Cir. 1966); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 1987).
But see Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); United States v. Summe, 208 F. Supp. 925 (D.C. Ky 1967) (communications relating to preparation of tax return privileged).{/footnote}

Where an organization uses an attorney to undertake an internal investigation of alleged or actual wrongdoing, not all communications between the attorney and members of the organization will be deemed privileged.  As one court has pointed out:
if all activities of a lawyer are to be classified as warranting the bar of discovery proceedings because of the attorney-client privilege, then it would be appropriate for clients to retain lawyers  as investigators, custodians of records and the like, thereby turning the shield of the privilege into the sword of injustice.{footnote}Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 691 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1997), quoting Metalsalts Corp. v. Weiss, 184 A.2d 435 (N.J. Super. 1962){/footnote}

Where an attorney is merely advising the client of a hearing or trial date, a  number of courts have held the communication not to be privileged, generally on the theory that the attorney is merely acting as a conduit, relaying information originating from the court.{footnote}United States v. Clemons, 676 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Uptain, 552 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 866 (1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Des Moines, Iowa, 568 F.2d 555, 557 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999; United States v. Freeman, 519 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); United States v. Hall, 346 F.2d 875 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 947 (1965); United States v. Woodruff, 383 F. Supp. 696 (D. Penn. 1974).
 Downie v. Superior Court, 888 P.2d 1306 (Alaska Ct.App. 1995); People v. Williamson, 839 P.2d 519 (Colo. Ct.App. 1992); Watkins v. State, 516 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. Dist.Ct. App. 1987); Korff v. State, 567 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 871 (1991); State v. Breazeale, 713 P.2d 973 (Kan. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Ogle, 682 P.2d 267 (Ore. 1984); Austin v. State,  934 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).{/footnote}

5(b)(2).  Statements in Furtherance of a Crime or Fraud

Communications with the purpose of furthering a future or continuing crime or fraud are not privileged.{footnote}U.S. v. Zolin, __U.S.___, 109 S. Ct. 2619 (1989); In re Doe, 551 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1977) (communications regarding plan to bribe a juror not privileged); United States v. Ballard, 779 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1985); In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 1243 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1975) (communications regarding plan to commit perjury not privileged); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Special September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 60-61 & n.16 (7th Cir. 1980) (communications for purpose of having attorney file fraudulent reports with government not privilege); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 456 F.2d 545, 551 (8th Cir. 1972) (communications for purpose of enforcing fraudulently-obtained patent not privileged); United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.) (deciding which among several conversations were admissible under the crime-fraud exception), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (communication must not only relate to wrongful conduct, but must also have been intended to further the conduct); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1975) (communications intended to further fraud against U.S. Patent Office not privileged).
Cal. Evid. C. § 956; Ex Parte Enzor, 117 So.2d 361 (Ala. 1960); Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997); Fassihi v. Sommers, Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, PC, 309 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. App. 1981)
See ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(C)(2), (3); ABA Opinions 155, 156 (1936); 31 Alr4th 458 (statements relating to intended civil fraud); 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 285, p. 812.
CHECK In re Richard Roe, Inc., 68 F.3d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1995) ("the crime-fraud exception does not apply simply because privileged communications would provide an adversary with evidence of a crime or fraud"){/footnote}  It is not enough that a communication refers to or relates to the client’s intention to commit future criminal or fraudulent conduct; the client must be seeking advice or assistance in furtherance of the wrongful conduct in order for the communication to lose its privilege.{footnote}People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583, 622, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 973 (1990) (crime-fraud exception "permits disclosure only of communications made to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime or fraud"); Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997) (client’s statement to attorney of his intent to commit arson would be privileged unless client was seeking advice or assistance in furtherance of arson).{/footnote}

Ordinarily, a conversations with an attorney concerning a crime or fraud which has been committed in the past are privileged, {footnote}Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 357-60 (1891); {/footnote} but not where the communication has the added purpose of furthering an ongoing fraud.{footnote}United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895. 909-10 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976) (defrauding of insurance carrier).{/footnote}
The burden of showing that this exception applies is on the party claiming that it applies.{footnote}Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997).
M.A. Larkin, Federal Testimonial Privileges § 2:07, at 2-150 (1995); P.R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege In The United States § 8:3, at 571-572 (1993); S.N. Stone & R.K. Taylor, Testimonial Privileges § 1.65, at 1-173 — 1-174 (2d ed. 1995){/footnote}  To overcome the privilege, the proponent of the evidence must make a prima facie showing that the client was engaging in or contemplating criminal or fraudulent conduct at the time of the consultation and that the communication was related to that conduct.{footnote}Clark v. U.S., 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1984); Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1988); Natta v. Zletz, 418 F.2d 633, (7th Cir. 1969); In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395 (App. D.C. 1985).
See also In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 491 & n.7 (2d Cir. 1982) (must be showing of “probably cause” that exception to privilege applies)
See also Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997) (burden of proving applicability of exception is “preponderance of the evidence”).{/footnote}  Upon a factual showing to support a reasonable, good-faith belief that the crime-fraud exception applies, the trial may require in camera examination of the communication to determine if it is privileged.{footnote}United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 572 (1989) (party opposing the privilege may use any nonprivileged evidence to support its request for the in camera review).
Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997).
See also § 6 (e).  Disclosure to Court, infra.{/footnote} 

5(c). Confidentiality

To be privileged, a communication must have been made in confidence,{footnote}United States v. Weger, 709 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir. 1983).{/footnote} although any communication made in the course of the attorney-client relationship is in many states presumed to be confidential.{footnote}Cal. § 917.{/footnote}  A communication is not considered confidential which the client intended to be made public{footnote}Corll v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 646 N.E.2d  721, 724 (Ind. App. 1995).{/footnote} or passed on to someone outside the privileged relationship.{footnote}United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 n. 3 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. (Under Seal), 748 F.2d 871 (4th Cir, 1984).
Idaho R. Evid. 502(a)(5) (to be confidential, communication must “not be intended to be disclosed to third persons”); Tex. R. Civ. Evid. 503(a)(5) (same); Owen v. Birmingham Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 183 N.W.2d 403 (Mich. App. 1970).
But see Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v. School Dist. of Sheboygan Falls, 546 N.W.2d 143, 149 (Wis. 1996) (letter from school distrcit’s attorney to school district regarding discpline of school administrator privileged even though contents shared with administrator; disclosure to administrator held to be in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services).{/footnote}  See also Waiver, below, and PRIVILEGE–Confidentiality.  On the other hand, drafts of such documents reflecting legal advice given to the client have been held privilege by some courts.{footnote}Schenet v. Anderson, 678 F. Supp. 1280, 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1988).
Kobluk v. University of Minnesota, 574 N.W.2d 436, 443-44 (Minn. 1998).
Contra In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 33 F.3d 342 (4th Cir. 1994).{/footnote}

Communications made in the presence of a third party who is not an agent of the attorney or the client have been held not confidential, and therefore not privileged.{footnote}United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645-46 (5th Cir. 1981) (presence of informant at joint defense meeting between codefendants and their counsel rendered communications non-privileged); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980); U.S. v. Landof, 591 F.2d 36, 39 (9th Cir. 1978).
State v. Soto, 933 P.2d 66 (Hawaii 1997) (conversation in courthouse hallway in presence of, and heard by, informant not privileged; no invasion of right to counsel; distinguishing Weatherford because federal courts have no statutory privilege); State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Iowa 1996);
8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2311 at 601-02 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).{/footnote} Courts have applied the privilege where the client reasonably but mistakenly believed that the communication would not be overheard by or reported to anyone else.{footnote}United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 752 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991); Griffith v. Davis, 161 F.R.D. 687, 694-95 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
But see Clagett v. Commonwealth, 472 S.E.2d 263 (Va. 1996) (privilege waived where no evidence that prosecution forensic witness overheard defense attorneys’ conversation “intentionally or surreptitiously”).{/footnote}  On the other hand, the privilege is recognized where the third person is an agent or someone else whose presence is reasonably necessary.{footnote}Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1984); United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1981).
Cal. § 952; Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110 § 52 (a privilege is not waived because made in the presence of interpreter).
Annot., 14 A.L.R.4th 594.{/footnote}  See also PRIVILEGES–Waiver.

6.  Procedure

6(a).  Generally

Whether a communication is privileged is determined by the trial court.{footnote}Ex Parte DCH Regional Med. Ctr., 683 So.2d 409, 412 (Ala. 1996).{/footnote}  The witness is not entitled to decide the question for himself or herself.{footnote}Ex Parte DCH Regional Med. Ctr., 683 So.2d 409, 412 (Ala. 1996); Schein v. Northern Rio Arriba Elec. Coop., 932 P.2d 490 (N.M. 1997) (attorney billing statements to client not privileged merely because client declares them “sensitive”).{/footnote}

6(b).  Standing to Assert or Waive Privilege

The privilege is personal in nature and generally only the client or the client’s representative may waive or assert it.  Persons representing or acting on behalf of the client who may assert or waive the privilege include the client’s attorney, conservator, guardian, executor or administrator.{footnote}Cal. § 953.{/footnote}  A bankruptcy trustee may assert or waive the privilege as to pre-petition communications.{footnote}CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 105 S.Ct. 1986, 85 L.Ed.2d 372 (1985).{/footnote}  The attorney involved in the communication has no privilege in his or her own right to assert.{footnote}United States v. Juarez, 573 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1978).{/footnote}  If the client desires to waive the privilege, the attorney cannot assert it on the client’s behalf.{footnote}United States v. Juarez, 573 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1978).{/footnote}  See also 9.  Waiver, infra, and PRIVILEGES–Standing to Assert.
Where the client is not present to assert the privilege, the privilege may be asserted by the client’s attorney,{footnote}State v. Bean, 239 N.W.2d 556, 561 (Iowa 1976).
McCormick On Evidence § 92, p. 193 (2d ed. 1972).{/footnote} any party to the proceeding,{footnote}McCormick On Evidence § 92, p. 193 (2d ed. 1972).{/footnote} or the court on its own motion.{footnote}McCormick On Evidence § 92, p. 193 (2d ed. 1972).{/footnote}  Clients have standing to assert or waive the privilege even if they are not parties to the proceeding in which disclosure of the communication is being sought.{footnote}United Coal Companies v. Powell Construction Company et al., 839 F.2d 958, 965 (3d Cir. 1988) (applying Pa. law)
Blickle v. Bell-Thomson, 31 Phila. 235, 1996 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 27 (Pa. App. 1996).{/footnote} 

6(c).  Sufficiency of Objection

The privilege cannot be asserted in a blanket fashion, but must be asserted question-by-question, or document-by-document.{footnote}United States v. Rockwell Int’l, 897 F.2d 1255 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
Hayworth v. Schilli Leasing, 669 N.E.2d 165, 169 (Ind. 1996); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum (Farber), 574 A.2d 449 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989)
Check United States v. Lawless, 709 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1983).{/footnote}

6(d).  Burden of Proof

The burden of establishing the applicability of the attorney-client privilege is on the person claiming the privilege.{footnote}United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 923 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 908, and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1034 (1985); In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983); Federal Trade Comm. v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 202 App. D.C. 207 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
Ex Parte DCH Regional Med. Ctr., 683 So.2d 409, 411 (Ala. 1996); CNR Investments Inc. v. Jefferson Trust & Savings Bank, 451 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. App. 1983); Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997); State v. Gordon, 1997 N.H. LEXIS 25; Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 520 (N.D. 1954); Huie v. Deschazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 926 (Tex. 1996); State ex re. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc. v. Bedell, 484 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1997).
M.A. Larkin, Federal Testimonial Privileges § 2.05 [2], at 2-98 (1995); P.R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege In The United States § 11:9, at 971 (1993); S.N. Stone & R.K. Taylor, Testimonial Privileges § 1.61, at 1-161 (2d ed. 1995).{/footnote}  Where a witness is being prosecuted for criminal contempt, however, the ultimate burden of persuasion is on the prosecution.{footnote}Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66, 45 S. Ct. 18, 69 L. Ed. 162 (1924); United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 70 S. Ct. 739, 94 L. Ed. 906 (1950); United States v. Patterson, 219 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1955).  [check whether all these are atty-client priv; if not, move to PRIVILEGE].{/footnote}  See also PRIVILEGES–Burden of Proof.

6(e).  Disclosure to Court In Camera

The claimant must disclose to the court the circumstances relevant to a determination of whether the privilege applies.{footnote}United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 924 (2d Cir. 1961); People’s Bank of Buffalo v. Brown, 112 F.2d 652 (3d Cir. 1902); Steiner v. United States, 134 F.2d 931, 935 (5th Cir. 1943); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 864 (8th Cir. 1956){/footnote} The court may review the allegedly privileged communications in camera for the purpose of deciding applicability of the privilege.{footnote}United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) (crime-fraud exception); Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 548 (2d Cir 1991); Haines v. Liggett Group, Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Grand Jury, 906 F.2d 1485, 1492 (10th Cir 1990).{/footnote}   See also "Burden of Proof" section, supra.

7.  As a Qualified Privilege

The attorney-client privilege is generally held to be absolute, in the sense that it cannot be pierced on a showing of need.{footnote}E.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1493-94 (9th Cir. 1989).{/footnote}
It has been held that the privilege is not absolute, but may be pierced upon a showing of need, relevance and materiality, and that the information could not be secured from any less intrusive source.{footnote}Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 691 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1997) (“That principle is especially appropriate in this case, where the powerful public interest in eliminating discrimination and sexual harassment is present and where defendant’s claim to the privilege is tenuous at best.”)
See also Dietz v. Doe, 935 P.2d 611 (Wash. 1997) (“the privilege is not absolute; rather, it is limited to the purpose for which it exists”).{/footnote} Some courts also require a showing by the party asserting the privilege that disclosure would prejudice the purported client.{footnote}Ex Parte Gonzalez, 686 So. 2d 204, 207 (Ala. 1996).{/footnote}

On the other hand, some courts have held that once the statutory elements of the privilege have been established, the court has no discretion but to uphold the privilege.{footnote}Huie v. Deschazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. 1996) (“If the special role of a fiduciary does justify such an exception, it should be instituted as an amendment to Rule 503 through the rulemaking process.”){/footnote}

8.  Adverse Inferences

A number of courts have held that an adverse inference may be drawn from a witness’ proper assertion of the attorney-client privilege,{footnote}Harris v. C.I.R., 461 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Electro Med. Sys. v. Cooper Life Sciences, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (allowing negative inference in civil case); Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1034 (1987) (alleged infringer’s failure to disclose attorney’s advice permits inference that advice was unfavorable); ALM Surgical Equip., Inc. v. Kirschner Med. Corp., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241, 1251 n.6 (same).
Marcus v. Marcus, 394 A.2d 727 (Conn. 1978); Monco v. Janus Enterprises, 583 N.E.2d 575, 577 (Ill. App. 1991); Fried v. Bradley, 52 So. 2d 247 (La. 1950); Phillips v. Chase, 87 N.E. 755 (Mass. 1909); In re McFadden, 108 A.2d 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1954); Bayou Drilling Co. v. Baillio, 312 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Ct.  App. 1958).
See also Chromalloy Mining & Minerals v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120, 1127 (5th Cir. 1980) (affirming finding of unfair labor practices without addressing merits of administrative judge drawing adverse inference from employer’s withholding of documents under claim of privilege).{/footnote} although there is authority to the contrary.{footnote}In re Tudor Associates, Ltd. II, 20 F.3d 115 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Waldman, 941 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1991); A.B. Dick Co. v. Marr, 95 F. Supp. 83, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), appeal dismissed, 197 F.2d 498 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878 (1952).
Metzger v. Silverman, 133 Cal. Rptr. 355 (Cal. App. 1976); Regan v. Garfield Ridge Trust & Savings Bank, 581 N.E.2d 759 (Ill. App. 1991); Lauer v. Banning, 131 N.W. 783, 785 (Iowa 1911); Lipton Realty, Inc. v. St. Louis Housing Auth., 705 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. App.  1986).{/footnote}  Some courts have required that the privilege be asserted in the jury’s presence so that jury is aware of reason for unavailablity of the evidence.{footnote}United California Bank v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 681 P.2d 390 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (attorney in case required to assert privilege in presence of jury so that jury is aware of reason for unavailablity of the evidence); Pennsylvania v. Sims, 521 A.2d 391, 395 (Pa. 1987).
Contra Lipton Realty, Inc. v. St. Louis Housing Auth., 705 S.W.2d 565, 570-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Stanger v. Gordon, 244 N.W.2d 628, 632 (Minn. 1976).
See generally Deborah Stavile Bartel, Drawing Negative Inferences Upon A Claim Of The Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1355 (1995).{/footnote} Proposed FRE 513 prohibitted negative inferences from the assertion of any privilege,{footnote}Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 513 provided:

    (a) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of a privilege, whether in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom.

    (b) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury.

    (c) Jury Instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom.{/footnote} and approximately 30 states have adopted some version of proposed FRE 513.{footnote}Alaska R. Evid. 512; Ark. R. Evid. 512; Cal. Evid. Code § 913; Del.  Code. Ann. § 512; Haw. R. Evid. 513; Idaho R. Evid. 512; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60439; Ky. R. Evid. 511; Mont. R. Evid. 505; Neb. R. Evid. 27-513; Nev. Rev.  Stat. § 49.405; N.H. R. Evid. 512; N.J. R. Evid. 532; N.M. R. Evid. 11-513; N.D.  R. Evid. 512; Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2513; Or. R. Evid. 513; S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 109-13; Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 513, Tex. R. Evid. 513; Utah R. Evid. 507(c); Vt. R. Evid. 512; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 905.13.
See generally Deborah Stavile Bartel, Drawing Negative Inferences Upon A Claim Of The Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1355 (1995).{/footnote}  Louisiana and Maine allow adverse inferences to be drawn from the assertion of any privilege in civil cases, but not criminal cases.{footnote}Me. R. Evid. 513 (West 1994); La. Code Evid. Ann. art. 503 (West 1995). {/footnote}

9.  Waiver

9(a).  Generally

A client can waive the attorney-client privilege explicitly or by implication.{footnote}State v. Walen, 1997 Minn. LEXIS 369 (Minn. 1997).
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2327 (McNaughton rev. 1961).{/footnote}
A client may waive the privilege by voluntarily disclosing a communication to someone outside the attorney-client relationship.{footnote}Haw. R. Evid. 511 (1993); Farr v. Mischler, 923 P.2d 446, 452 (Idaho 1996) (where letter was kept in corporation’s files which were sold as assets of the corporation, privilege was waived).  
Mccormick ON EVIDENCE § 93, at 226-27 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
See § 4.  Members of the Privileged Relationship; § 5(a)(1).  Presence of Third Parties, supra.{/footnote}  The client may waive the privilege by producing an otherwise privileged document in discovery,{footnote}CHECK Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (limited waiver by disclosure to SEC)
[570] Edens v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 858 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1988).
State ex rel. McCormick v. Zakaib, 430 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1993).
But see Minatronics Corporation v. Buchanan Ingersoll, 143 Pittsburgh Legal Journal 228 (1995) (disclosure does not waive privilege where, inter   alia, counsel took reasonable steps after learning of inadvertent production of allegedly privileged document).
CHECK But see Transamerican Computer Co. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 1978) (dictum suggesting that inadvertent disclosure in discovery might not constitute waiver).

CHECK Pacificorp. v. Dept. of Revenue, 838 P.2d 914, 919 (Mont. 1992).{/footnote} by introducing all or part of an otherwise privileged communication into evidence,{footnote}Re Weisman, 835 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1987); Hollins v. Powell, 773 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1985).{/footnote} or by putting in issue the substance of the communication.{footnote}Re Continental Illinois Securities Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302 (7th Cir. 1984); Sedco Int’l, S.A. v. Cory, 683 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1982).
Ulibarri v. Superior Court, 909 P.2d 449 (Ariz. App. 1995); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. DiFede, 780 P.2d 533, 544, Colo. 1989); League v. Vanice, 221 Neb. 34, 374 N.W.2d 849, 856, Neb. 1985).
CHECK Connell v. Bernstein-Macaulay, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 420, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975); Prink v. Rockefeller Center, 398 N.E.2d 517, 521-22 (N.Y. 1979).{/footnote}  Thus, where an organization engages attorneys to investigate alleged or actual wrongdoing, and then use the fact of the investigation as a defense to show the wrongdoing was not tolerated, courts may deem the privilege is waived.{footnote}Payton v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 691 A.2d 321 (N.J. 1997) (where attorneys engaged by turnpike authority to investigate harrassment claim, authority may have waived privilege by using fact of investigation as an affirmative defense).
CHECK Harding v. ____ , 914 F. Supp. ____, 1091-97.{/footnote}

Where, however, disclosure has been ordered by a court, it has been held that the client does not waive the claim of privilege by complying with the order, and even using some of the privileged communications as part of its case.{footnote}Ward v. Succession of Freeman, 854 F.2d 780, 788-89 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, __U.S.___, 109 S. Ct. 2064 (1989).{/footnote}

Courts are divided as to the effect of inadvertent disclosure: some courts holding that inadvertant disclosure does not operate as a waiver,{footnote}Helman v. Murry’s Steaks, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Del. 1990), superseded by statute as stated in Young v. West Coast Indus. Relations Ass’n, 144 F.R.D. 206 (D. Del 1992); Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991), aff’d in part, question certified, 991 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1993); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb. 1985); Fidelity Bank, 1989 WL 9354, at *1; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 18 F.R.D. 448, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Fidelity Bank, N.A. v. Bass, No. CIV.A.88-5257, 1989 WL 9354 (E.D. Penn. Feb. 8, 1989).{/footnote} may operate to waive the privilege,{footnote}Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1981); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Turner & Newell, PLC, 137 F.R.D. 178, 182 (D. Mass. 1991); In re Standard Fin. Management Corp., 77 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (dicta); International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1988); Thomas v. Pansy Ellen Prods., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 237, 243 (W.D.N.C. 1987); Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 208 (M.D.N.C. 1986); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 775 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Rockland Indus. v. Frank Kasmir Assocs., 470 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
Dalen v. Ozite Corp., 230 Ill. App. 3d 18, 594 N.E.2d 475 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1992).
See generally Roberta M. Harding, Waiver: A Comprehensive Analysis Of A Consequence Of Inadvertently Producing Documents Protected By The Attorney-Client Privilege, 42 Cath. U.L. Rev. 465 (1993); Robert J. Franco & Michael E. Prangle, The Inadvertent Waiver of Privilege, 26 Tort & Ins. L.J. 637 (1991); Note, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 598 (1983).{/footnote} either as to the specific document at issue{footnote}Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Ind. 1990); International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1988); Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 46, 52 (M.D. N.C. 1987), aff’d, 878 F.2d. 801 (4th Cir. 1989){/footnote} or in some jurisdictions, as to all documents regarding the same subject matter.{footnote}In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 461 (N.D. Cal. 1978); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 132 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1990); Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Blondis, 412 F. Supp. 286, 289 (N.D. Ill. 1976); Standard Chartered Bank PLC v. Ayala Int’l Holdings (U.S.), Inc., 111 F.R.D. 76, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); FDIC v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 479, 484 (E.D. Va. 1991).
4 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice, 26.602, at 26-174 to 26-176 (1993).{/footnote}  In general, however, the taking of reasonably security measures will avoid the finding of waiver.{footnote}See generally Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnaise (Suisse) S.A., 160 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).{/footnote} 

[By Attorney.  Unauthorized disclosure by an attorney of a client’s confidences does not operate as a waiver.{footnote}Carmona v. State, 941 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App. 1997) (defendant’s criminal attorney disclosure to prosecutor of privileged report regarding defendant’s polygraph examination held not sufficient, standing alone, to support finding of waiver).
See also Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262, 1267 (Ind. 1996) (communications with paralegal for purposes of obtaining advice from an attorney with paralegal’s law firm held privileged even though disclosed by paralegal to police officer without client’s consent).
check Chavez v. Watts, 161 Ill. App. 3d 664, 515 N.E.2d 146 (1st Dist. 1987); Key v. State, 132 N.E.2d 143, 145 (1956).{/footnote} The fact privileged materials have been disclosed by the client’s attorney is relevant to the issue of waiver but does not establish a "presumptive" or "automatic waiver."{footnote}Carmona v. State, 941 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App. 1997).{/footnote}  Implicit waiver will sometimes be found where the attorney’s disclosure took place in the client’s presence.{footnote}Burnett v. State, 642 S.W.2d 765, 770-71 (Tex.Cr.App. 1982).
But see Cruz v. State, 586 S.W.2d 861, 865 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979) (waiver not implied).{/footnote}

The party seeking to show waiver has the burden of going forward with evidence that supports a finding of waiver.{footnote}Carmona v. State, 941 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App. 1997).{/footnote} The court may examine the totality of the circumstances and reasonable inferences therefrom to determine whether the privilege has been waived.{footnote}Carmona v. State, 941 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App. 1997).{/footnote}
Once waived, the privilege may not be reasserted as to the same communciation.{footnote}United States v. Suarez, 820 F.2d 1158 (11th Cir. 1987).{/footnote}

9(b).  Waiver as to Documents On the Same Subject Matter

Disclosure of a privileged communication results not just in a waiver as to that communication, but also in "subject matter waiver"– waiver with respect to any other privileged information regarding the same subject.{footnote}In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1655 (1989).{/footnote}

9(c).  Disputes Regarding Attorney’s Services

A client implicitly waives the privilege by alleging a breach of duty by the attorney.{footnote}State v. Walen, 1997 Minn. LEXIS 369 (Minn. 1997) (claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2327 at 638 (McNaughton rev. 1961).{/footnote}  Thus, the privilege is deemed waived in connection with malpractice actions,{footnote}Check Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1967); Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1974).{/footnote} claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,{footnote}Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1967); Tasby v. United States, 504 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1974).
State v. Kruchten, 417 P.2d 510 (Ariz. 1966); In re Gray, 123 Cal. App. 3d 614, 176 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1981) (no attorney-client privilege in habeas corpus proceeding); Michigan v. Mitchell, 560 N.W.2d 600 (Mich. 1997); State v. Walen, 1997 Minn. LEXIS 369 (Minn. 1997); Ex Parte Mowbray, 1996 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 253 at n. 3. {/footnote} disciplinary proceedings (?), actions for collection of fee,{footnote}Cal. § 958.{/footnote} and disputes as to whether a settlement was authorized.{footnote}Clark v. Foley L. Burden Jones Buick GMC Trucks, Inc., 917 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1996) (privilege does not prevent attorney from testifying as to client’s instructions regarding settlement in hearing where this is disputed. citing Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130-1.6(b)).{/footnote}  Waiver may be found despite the fact that the client is not a party in the proceeding.{footnote}Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Fink, 141 Cal. App. 2d 332 (1956); Blickle v. Bell-Thomson, 31 Phila. 235, 1996 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 27 (Pa. App. 1996).{/footnote}  See also PRIVILEGES § 7.  Waiver.

It has been held that the waiver is limited to communications relevant to the issue of the alleged breach of duty.{footnote}State v. Walen, 1997 Minn. LEXIS 369 (Minn. 1997) (ineffective assistance of counsel).
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2327 (McNaughton rev. 1961).{/footnote}

10.  End of Attorney-Client Relationship

The attorney-client privilege survives the termination of the attorney-client relationship.{footnote}Kevlik v. Goldstein, 724 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1984).{/footnote}

9(a).  Deceased Client

The privilege survives the death of the client.{footnote}Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 141 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1998) (criminal case).
State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084, 1086 (Ariz. 1976); In re John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 70 (Mass. 1990); State v. Doster, 284 S.E.2d 218, 219 (S.C. 1981).
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2323 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Frankel, The Attorney-Client Privilege After the Death of the Client, 6 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 45, 78-79 (1992); 1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 94, p. 348 (4th ed. 1992).
But see Cal. Evid. Code §§ 953, 954 (West 1995) (implying that privilege may be asserted only so long as estate exists); Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 357 A.2d 689, 692-93 (Pa. Super. 1976) (privilege generally survives death, except where the interest of justice is compelling and the interest of the client in preserving the confidence was insignificant); C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, 2 Federal Evidence § 199, at 380-381 (2d ed. 1994) (supporting rule set forth in Cohen); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 127, Comment d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, Mar. 29, 1996) (same). {/footnote}  Any person representing the client (attorney, executor, administrator) may assert the privilege.{footnote}Mayberry v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (Ind. 1996) (privilege survives death of client and accrues to client’s representative).
But see State v. Jarvis, 483 S.E.2d 38 (W. Va. 1996).{/footnote}  See Standing to Assert, above, and PRIVILEGE–Standing to Assert. 

Under the theory that disclosure would be desired by the deceased, a personal representative of the deceased client can waive the privilege when heirs or devisees claim through the deceased client.{footnote}United States v. Osborn, 561 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1977).
Ala. R. Evid. 502 (1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 16-41-101, Rule 502 (Supp. 1997); Doyle v. Reeves, 152 A. 882 (Conn. 1931); DeLoach v. Myers, 109 S.E.2d 777, 780-781 (Ga. 1959); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27 503, R. 503 (1995).

Check Cal. Evid. C. § 957; Stappas v. Stappas, 122 So. 2d 393, 396 (Ala. 1960); Denver Nat’l Bank v. McLagan, 298 P.2d 386, 388 (Colo. 1956); Manley v. Combs, 30 S.E.2d 485, 493 (Ga. 1944); Barcello v. Elliott, 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996).
{/footnote} An attorney who is an attesting witness to a document such as a deed or will may testify as to the client’s statements insofar as they reflect on the client’s intent and state of mind, just as any other witness may.{footnote}Cal. Evid C. §§ 959, 960; Bradway v. Thompson, 214 S.W. 27 (Ark. 1919){/footnote} 

9(b).  Bankruptcy Trustees

11.  Criminal Cases and the Constitution

The attorney-client privilege is the same in criminal cases as in civil cases.{footnote}Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 141 L. Ed. 2d 379 (1998).{/footnote}

11(a). The Right to Counsel

In criminal cases, the government’s invasion of the attorney-client privilege may also be deemed a violation of the defendant’s right to counsel,{footnote}CHECK See United States v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428 (D.C. Cir. 1974)(Sixth Amendment right to counsel precluded government from introducing fact that defendant obtained counsel near time that crime discovered).{/footnote} or right to effective assistance of counsel.{footnote}See, e.g., In Re Criminal Investigation No. 1/296X, 646 A.2d 389 (Md. 1994) ("while never given an explicit constitutional underpinning, the privilege is, nevertheless, closely tied to the federal, as well as this State’s, constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel and could, if limited too severely, make these basic guarantees virtually meaningless.") (quoting State v. Pratt, 398 A.2d 421, 423 (1979).
CHECK Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 n. 4 (1977) (government plant); U.S. v. Mastroianni, 749 F.2d 900, 907-08 (1st Cir. 1984).
But see State v. Soto, 933 P.2d 66 (1997) (distinguishing Weatherford because federal courts have no statutory privilege).{/footnote}  On the other hand, courts have held that where there has been no invasion of the attorney-client privilege by the disclosure of a communication, there has been no infringement of the defendant’s right to counsel.{footnote}United States v. Melvin, 650 F.2d 641, 645-46 (5th Cir. 1981) (presence of informant at joint defense meeting between codefendants and their counsel rendered communications non-privileged; no deprivation of right to counsel).
State v. Soto, 933 P.2d 66 (1997){/footnote}

11(b). Confrontation Clause

Where a prosecution witness in a criminal case asserts the privilege in response to questioning by the defense, courts balance the competing interests of confidentiality against the defendant’s right to effective cross-examination.{footnote}U.S. ex rel. Blackwell v. Franzen, 688 F.2d 496, 500-01 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1072 (1983) (upholding invocation of privilege where there was already ample evidence impeaching accomplice’s testimony).
State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 299-300 (Ariz. 1996) (upholding invocation of privilege where testimony would have been cumulative and relevant fact could have been brought out through witness without invading privilege); Neku v. U.S., 620 A.2d 259, 263 (D.C. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 577 (1993).{/footnote}

12.  Appeal

Whether the prvilege applies to a communication involves mixed questions of fact and law, and are reviewable de novo.{footnote}Accord Huie v. Deschazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 927-28 (Tex. 1996) (question as to whether trustee could assert privilege to prevent his communications with attorney from being disclosed to beneficiary was not matter over which trial court had discretion).
Contra United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509 (1st Cir. 1986).
Contra Ex Parte DCH Regional Med. Ctr., 683 So.2d 409, 412 (Ala. 1996) (whether communication is privileged is question of fact; trial court’s ruling will be affirmed where it is not “arbitrary or capricious.”); Purcell v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District, 676 N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997) (whether privilege exists and whether crime-fraud exception applies are questions of fact for trial court); State v. Gordon, 1997 N.H. LEXIS 25 (N.H. 1997) (whether privilege applies rests within sound discretion of trial court).{/footnote}

Bibliography

M.A. Larkin, Federal Testimonial Privileges (1995)
P.R. Rice, Attorney-Client Privilege In The United States (1993)
S.N. Stone & R.K. Taylor, Testimonial Privileges  (2d ed. 1995)
Comment, Developments In The Law: Privileged Communications: III. Attorney-Client Privilege, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1501 (1985).