§ 1461. Relief

(a) If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has committed a hate-motivated crime against the complainant, or if the parties stipulate to an order, the court shall make such preliminary and final orders as it deems necessary to protect the complainant and the complainant’s property and other appropriate persons who are in need of protection and such persons’ property, including any of the following orders:

(1) an order to refrain from committing any crime against the complainant;

(2) an order restricting the defendant’s ability to contact the complainant;

(3) an order prohibiting the defendant from coming within a fixed distance of the complainant, the complainant’s residence or other designated locations where the complainant is likely to spend time;

(4) an order to refrain from committing a hate-motivated crime against the complainant, other appropriate persons who are in need of protection and members of any protected category.

(b) A preliminary order issued under this chapter shall remain in effect until a final order is issued or for a fixed period that the court deems appropriate, but in no event more than 120 days without a further order from the court. A final order shall be issued for a fixed period, but in no event more than two years without a further order from the court. The court may extend any order for such time as it deems necessary to protect the complainant, other appropriate persons who are in need of protection and members of any protected category. It shall not be necessary for the court to find that the defendant has committed a hate-motivated crime during the pendency of an order to extend the terms of the order; however, the court shall find that there is a reasonable basis for continued protection. The court may modify its order at any subsequent time upon motion by either party and a showing of good cause.

(c) Every preliminary or final order issued under this section shall bear the following language: VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER MAY BE PROSECUTED AS A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY A TERM OF IMPRISONMENT OR A FINE, OR BOTH, OR MAY BE PROSECUTED AS CRIMINAL CONTEMPT PUNISHABLE BY A TERM OF IMPRISONMENT OR A FINE, OR BOTH. (Added 1999, No. 56, § 3.)